

STUDIES

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**Illegal Fishing
US Coast Guard & the OSS
"The Fourth Man"
Intelligence in Public Media**

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Cover image: US Coast Guard Ens. Peyton Bowler, a commissioned officer aboard USCGC *Bear* (WMEC 901) near an iceberg, North Atlantic Ocean, August 17, 2022. The *Bear* was on the second half of its North Atlantic patrol and was working in tandem with the Northern Atlantic Fisheries Organization. (USCG photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Matthew Abban)

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IN MEMORIAM

Vaughn F. Bishop (1946–2023)

For Immediate Release: March 27, 2023

Statement by CIA Director William J. Burns on the Passing of Vaughn Bishop

CIA mourns the passing of former Deputy Director Vaughn Bishop. Vaughn personified what it means to be a CIA officer during his long and storied career. He cared deeply about the CIA and even more so about the women and men who serve in it. He inspired countless officers and was known for his always approachable demeanor, good humor, and willingness to listen to and learn from others—from the most junior officer to the most senior. Our Agency and our country have lost a true patriot. He will be deeply missed and always remembered.

—William J. Burns, D/CIA and David S. Cohen, DD/CIA—

Using Intelligence to Counter Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing

Peter C. Oleson

Identifying IUU is a needle-in-a-haystack problem. Which boats are engaged in IUU fishing? How can one determine that a vessel is so engaged? What is the flag nation of the vessel of interest? Who owns the vessel? Answering these and other questions requires surveillance, deep understanding of fishing operations and behavior, and analysis.

Author's note: This article is the result of two years of examination of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific by the International Maritime Security Exchange (IMSE) working group. It draws from the proceedings of the IMSE conferences in Hawaii in 2021 and 2022, as well as work by journalists such as Ian Urbina (New York Times). A list of resources on IUU fishing, including IMSE presentations, is provided at the end of this article.

IMSE is supported by the Navy League, the Daniel K. Inouye Center for Asia-Pacific Security Studies, the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and Pacific Forum, a non-profit, foreign policy research institute based in Honolulu.

Countering IUU Fishing is an Intelligence Problem

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a worldwide problem. According to a US Coast Guard (USCG) report on the subject in 2020, "IUU fishing has replaced piracy as the leading global maritime security threat. If IUU fishing continues unchecked, we can expect deterioration of fragile coastal States and increased tension among foreign-fishing Nations, threatening geo-political stability around the world."

There are many aspects to the problem. Illegal fishing is conducted in waters under the jurisdiction of a state but without the permission of that state. Unreported fishing involves catch that has not been reported, as required. Unregulated fishing occurs where there are no management measures and is conducted in a manner inconsistent with treaty responsibilities.

Monitoring the Crowded Oceans

The oceans are crowded with fishing boats. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimated that there are more than 4 million fishing boats worldwide. Many are small, unmotorized, and engaged in local fishing. Larger motorized fishing vessels are industrialized and are the prime actors in overfishing. China maintains by far the largest deep-water fishing fleet.

Identifying IUU fishing is a needle-in-a-haystack problem. Which boats are engaged in IUU fishing, and how do we identify them? What is the flag nation of the vessel of interest? Who owns the vessel? Answering these and other questions requires surveillance, deep understanding of fishing operations and behavior, and analysis. Those engaged in intentional IUU fishing often go to great lengths to disguise their activities.

Previously, surveillance of territorial waters and Exclusive Economic

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.



USCG Cutter *Stone* crew observing fishing activity during Operation Southern Cross in the South Atlantic, January 2, 2021. (US Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class John Hightower)

Zones (EEZs) relied on a nation's patrol ships and aircraft and active fishing boat transmissions, such as from the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), mandated by nations to monitor ships in their areas of responsibility. But IUU fishers often turn off these transmitters, or increasingly spoof their signals, to hide illegal activities. "[O]ver the past year, Windward, a large maritime data company that provides research to the United Nations, has uncovered more than 500 cases of ships manipulating their satellite navigation systems to hide their locations."^a

Ship-based aerial drones are proving to be a valuable adjunct to ships and aircraft for inobtrusive surveillance, according to the USCG, which

employs the ScanEagle drone from its newer cutters.^b ScanEagle allows unobtrusive over-the-horizon persistent surveillance of fishing vessels.

Northrop Grumman's MQ-4C Triton high-altitude drone, under development for the US Navy, is a potential broad-ocean-area surveillance capability applicable to countering IUU fishing. Its future capabilities were demonstrated extensively in the international 2022 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise off Hawaii. Australia has committed to buying the drone. Besides carrying electro-optical and infrared imagers the MQ-4C can carry the AN/ZPY-3 multi-function radar, optimized to detect objects on the sea. However, its high cost may preclude many nations from procuring the capability.

The vast spaces of the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Ocean fisheries pose a challenge to active sea-based or aircraft surveillance. But the application of high-altitude, long-endurance drones and the growing constellation of commercial satellites promise improvements in maritime surveillance, including for IUU fishing.

Satellite electro-optical imagery has been available commercially for years. Maxar Technologies (a merger of several commercial space technology companies, including DigitalGlobe and Orbital Sciences) provides to its government and commercial customers high-resolution (less than 0.5 meter) optical digital satellite imagery. Planet Labs also operates a constellation of imagery

a. Anatoly Kurmanaev. "How Fake GPS Coordinates Are Leading to Lawlessness on the High Seas," *New York Times*, September 3, 2022.

b. Address by Captain Holly Harrison, USCG, commander of the USCGC *Kimball*, to the September 2021 IMSE conference.



An MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) assigned to Unmanned Patrol Squadron 19 (VUP-19), at on the flight line at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, December 16, 2021. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nathan T. Beard)

satellites and states it has 700 customers. Imagery is limited by field of view, resolution, and weather, but when cued by other sources it can help identify suspicious vessels. Newer forms of imagery include the Visible and Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR). VIIRS is carried on NOAA's Joint Polar-orbiting Satellite System (JPSS) and is used to detect the bright nighttime lights used by many purse-seiner and ring-net fishing boats to attract squid and other species.

SAR allows surveillance in all-weather conditions as it penetrates clouds and darkness, and it provides multi-dimensional images. Civilian use of SAR satellite data began in 1992 with the European Space Agency's Earth Resources Satellite-1 (ERS-1). Since then, many nations have orbited SAR satellites, including

Japan, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Korea, and others. Commercial companies, such as Finland's Iceye, have recently entered the marketplace for SAR imagery.

The collection of radio frequency (RF) emissions by commercial satellites is a new capability. Several US and European firms have entered this market and can pick up navigation radar and other radio emissions from boats at sea even if the boats turn off their required AIS or VMS broadcasts. These capabilities are very useful in detecting, tracking, identifying, and understanding vessel's patterns that may be engaged in IUU fishing and spoofing active systems, such as AIS. The unclassified nature of the data permits wide sharing among nations and cueing of other sensor systems, such as electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar imagery. In development are unmanned vessels

that tow underwater hydrophones that can detect, classify, and report via satellite link vessels by type and activity through analysis of sonograms.

Detecting misreporting by legally registered fishing vessels has relied in the past on government-sponsored on-board inspectors riding along with a vessel. This is labor intensive and expensive, especially for smaller nations. Also, there have been cases of on-board inspectors disappearing during a voyage with no trace. Several organizations are experimenting with on-board automated video cameras, linked to satellite communications, to monitor activities and the appropriateness of catches.

The US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) has long tracked foreign warships and major merchant vessels. Fishing vessels, however, have not been included due to their high numbers, comparatively small

Adverse Impacts of IUU Fishing

High prices, high demand, and shrinking stocks have sparked a “get it while you still can” mentality. In aggregate there are an estimated 3,000 long-distance fishing vessels in the Indo-Pacific, one-third of which fish in prohibited waters without permission. Fifty percent under report what they have caught. Forty percent of the vessels never visit port, off-loading their catch and replenishing at sea.

Besides over harvesting, IUU fishing takes money from legal fishers and out of local economies. Fisheries are the primary source of income for many Pacific oceanic states. The Pew Foundation estimates that IUU fishing costs nations \$23.5 billion annually. The Nature Conservancy projects that many Pacific Island nations will not be able to meet their local food needs in a few years given their population growth and continued IUU fishing. The Nature Conservancy also estimates that more than 95 percent of IUU fishing activities by the Pacific tuna fleet involves unreported or misreported catch by legally licensed boats, not by so-called unregistered “dark boats.” IUU fishing also destroys habitat, especially bottom trawling that damages corals and sea grasses.

Other crimes are associated with IUU fishing, including forgery of records and fraud, corruption of officials, false vessel identity and flagging, licensing avoidance and deception, human rights abuses (e.g., forced labor, human trafficking, enforced prostitution, and child labor), illegal transshipments of catch and fuel, smuggling of drugs and protected species, black marketeering and money laundering, the evasion of penalties, and murder.

For a detailed treatment, see Ian Urbina’s series, “The Outlaw Ocean,” *New York Times Magazine* (2015) and his book by the same name (Knopf, 2019).

displacements, and limited national technical means dedicated to higher intelligence priorities. Into the void of surveying fishing fleets has stepped commercial industry, which has developed capabilities for visual, radar, and radio-frequency surveillance that previously were the exclusive domain of national intelligence agencies.

Data Integration, Analysis, and Sharing Are Critical

To support at-sea enforcement of laws and rules applicable to territorial waters and EEZs, the integration of all-source data is a necessity. Undoubtedly, tracking fishing fleets and specifically illegal fishers will require additional resources. One approach would incorporate public-private cooperation with those commercial firms that already integrate relevant data for their shipping industry and insurance customers. Given the increasing number of collection platforms it should not be difficult to sanitize the sources

for classified data to meet the IUU information requirements. These requirements include, *inter alia*, the time/location of specific ships; their historical movements and patterns (which can reveal at-sea rendezvous often indicative of illegal fishing and illegal transfers of catch to reefer vessels and out-of-port refueling); their suspected use of deceptive methods, such as spoofing tracking signals; their national identity (despite using flags of convenience); and their ownership. Timeliness of data is also important to allow both cross-cueing of collection methods and initiation of law enforcement operations.

The many sensor sources available can produce an overwhelming amount of data. And any one source is rarely sufficient to determine many kinds of IUU fishing. It is the integration of data from disparate sources and the analysis of those data that are critical. The data glut is a challenge requiring various advanced analytical techniques, including artificial intelligence and machine learning.

Determining suspicious vessel activities requires detailed knowledge of fish-rich ocean areas, the movement patterns of vessels engaged in various types of fishing, at-sea rendezvous for illegal transshipments or refueling, and other behaviors.

For the United States responsibility for data integration would logically fall to naval intelligence components, in conjunction with the US Coast Guard which has unique law-enforcement authorities. Several non-governmental organizations analyze data related to IUU fishing. Best known is Global Fishing Watch (GFW), an NGO that tracks in near real time fishing around the globe. The Australian Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) is the responsible overseer of fishing in the broad Southern Ocean surrounding Antarctica. The Pacific Islands Fishing Forum Agency, the International Maritime Control and Surveillance (IMCS) network, C4ADS, and several universities and

commercial firms, such as Windward AI, are also involved in aspects of analyzing IUU fishing to provide scientific insight, risk management judgments to companies, or assist in investigations of organizations and individuals behind such illegal activities.

Given the documented decrements in fish stocks and the reliance of many countries' populations on sea-based protein, preserving fish stocks is a priority national security concern for many nations, especially in the Pacific and Africa. The United States is in a unique position to share relevant data with many of these nations, and should do so in a manner that is both timely and integrative of all relevant collected and historical data. Commercial data providers and integrators, of course, have a profit motive. This limits the dissemination of their data to many smaller nations which cannot afford the contractual costs.

Employing a public-private partnership approach, the US government could provide the time-sensitive location data to international partners and compensate commercial companies adequately for the data they provide, leaving less time-sensitive data analysis to commercial companies and NGOs, which they can market, as appropriate (including to the US government).

Pacific nations have organized specialized intelligence centers focused on detecting IUU fishing. The Indonesian Maritime Information Center, for example, was established in 2020; Jakarta has long been the most aggressive in countering illegal fishers. It has seized, burned, and sunk foreign vessels caught



For the first time, USCG members conduct a boarding a fishing vessel in the Eastern Pacific under the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO), August 4, 2022. (USCG photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class John Hightower)

conducting IUU fishing within Indonesia's resource-rich EEZ.

Thailand has also focused government resources on improving its monitoring of maritime activities in its Thai Maritime Enforcement Coordination Center (Thai-MECC). The longest running intergovernmental center for tracking IUU fishing is

the Fisheries Forum Agency, which was founded in 1979 and focused on highly migratory fish stocks such as tuna.

The newly formed Quad of India, Australia, Japan, and the US is aimed at regional prosperity with many initiatives in the realms of economics, science, technology, human

UN Agreement on Protecting Marine Resources

After almost two decades of negotiations, in March 2023 the UN Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction adopted language for a treaty to protect marine diversity. The treaty language addresses the vast ocean areas beyond nations' exclusive economic zones, with the goal of preserving habitats and sharing marine resources in areas beyond national jurisdictions. The preamble states, "Recognizing the need to address, in a coherent and cooperative manner, biodiversity loss and degradation of ecosystems of the ocean, due to, in particular, climate change impacts on marine ecosystems, such as warming and ocean deoxygenation, as well as ocean acidification, pollution, including plastic pollution, and unsustainable use."

resources, and maritime-domain awareness. Countering IUU fishing is a major focus for the Quad nations.

Vice Admiral Andy Tiongson, US Coast Guard commander of the Pacific region, told the 2022 IMSE conference how the USCG through forensic analyses has helped Pacific countries prosecute illegal fishers and how Coast Guard personnel sail on foreign naval and coast guard ships under its ship-rider program.

Challenges remain, especially in the sharing of data and analyses. In the 2022 IMSE conference the heads of the US Pacific Fleet and Australian Navy and senior officers of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces emphasized that a free and open Indo-Pacific is critical to economic prosperity as well as maintenance of sovereignty and individual nations' national security. In their view, information sharing is fundamental to effective maritime operations between navies and other maritime forces.

It should be noted that historical concepts of protecting sources and methods have become increasingly obsolescent with the growth of the commercial space-based remote sensing industry and the commercial

development of technologies that were once classified. While some detailed collection will always remain secret, the time-sensitive location data on vessels at sea need not be classified.

The Future

IUU fishing has already led to tensions in the South China Sea. Since 2012, China has used its coast guard and expansive fishing fleet, often manned by its maritime militia, to intimidate and force Philippine fishers from the waters around Scarborough Shoal and others that sit within the Philippines EEZ and within Beijing's unilaterally claimed dashed-line in the South China Sea. This led to a United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration case that ruled against China, stating that there was no legal basis for China's claim of historic rights over the area within the dashed line.^a China has ignored the court's ruling.

The conflict over IUU fishing in the South China Sea, of course, is linked to China's claim that the entire sea is exclusively Chinese. The construction of artificial islands and their militarization has affected others, especially Vietnam, Malaysia,

and the Philippines. Some observers opine that it is only a matter of when Beijing's coercive actions, unless curtailed, will result in an armed clash.

IUU fishing knows no national boundaries. No one nation is capable of enforcing fishing laws and regulations. Countering IUU fishing will require investments, multi-state collaboration, intelligence sharing, and multilateral agreements between the numerous regional fishing management organizations (RFMOs). Some RFMOs are more promoters of fishing than regulators. Conservation officials and naval leaders have noted also that, to date, information-sharing has not always gone well.

There are approaches to IUU fishing beyond law enforcement. These include eliminating national subsidies for fishing. The PRC's subsidies, the most generous of any nation by far, estimated at approximately \$7.2 billion in 2017, make otherwise unprofitable fishing profitable. Certification of catches assures buyers of fish that they were caught legally. Publicity about IUU fishing and the deceptive practices associated with it is an important step in depressing market attractiveness of illegally caught fish. Finally, the promotion of aquaculture—China leads world production, accounting for 60 percent of global aquaculture—is a potential solution for future food needs. Aquaculture has grown steadily since the 1970s and now supplies more than half of all seafood consumed by humans.

Like climate change, seafood sustainability within the foreseeable future will increasingly become a crisis. Understanding and countering

a. *Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China)*, Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 2016



The crew of the USCG Cutter *Frederick Hatch* approach the *Ocean Galaxy* to conduct a fisheries boarding 195 nautical miles south of Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, on November 20, 2022. (US Coast Guard photo by Seaman Paula Betancourt)

IUU fishing is critical for many poorer nations and the worldwide

seafood market. Focusing intelligence on the collection of relevant data,

its integration, analysis and sharing should be a high priority.



The author: Peter C. Oleson is a former assistant director for plans and policy at the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was one of the organizers of the IMSE conferences in 2021 and 2022 in Hawaii, where he resides. He previously co-authored an article for *Studies in Intelligence* in 1997 on the Intelligence Community's contributions to the development of digital mammography.



Resources on IUU Fishing

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, <https://fao.org/home/en>

Global Fishing Watch, <https://globalfishingwatch.org>

IMSE, *Proceedings of the IMSE 2022 Conference* (August 4–5, 2022), <https://imsehawaii.org/imse-2022/2022-written-summary.html>

IMSE, *Proceedings of the IMSE 2022 Conference* (September 8–9, 2021), <https://imsehawaii.org/imse-2021/2021-written-summary.html>

International Maritime Organization, <https://imo.org>

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, <https://fisheries.noaa.gov>

The Nature Conservancy, <https://www.nature.org/en-us>

OCEANA, <https://usa.oceana.org>

Pacific Forum, <https://pacforum.org>

US Coast Guard, *Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing*, <https://uscg.mil/iuufishing>

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, <https://whoi.org/edu>

The US Coast Guard and OSS Maritime Operations During World War II

LCDR Michael Bennett, USCG

The Coast Guard's contribution to the Maritime Unit of OSS has been barely noted.

Editor's note: We have reprised this article from the December 2008 issue of Studies in Intelligence to provide some insight in to the Coast Guard's historical connection to the work of intelligence.

As the Intelligence Community continues its transformation and the Coast Guard intelligence program experiences enormous growth, members of both communities would be well-served by reflecting on the contributions Coast Guard intelligence has made in the past. From its beginning as the Revenue Marine in 1790, the Coast Guard's unique authorities, industry access, and organizational culture of adaptability have allowed it to make great contributions to intelligence and to important military successes in our nation's history.

Archived documents, many originally classified, and published histories show that Coast Guard intelligence officers have turned up in some unlikely places—sometimes by design, sometimes by accident, but most by dint of the nature of Coast Guard operations and missions. Examples include scouting and information gathering by revenue cutters during the War of 1812; Rum

War cryptanalysis and code breaking in the 1920s; HF/DF decryption work under the Office of Naval Intelligence before and during World War II, including the work of Field Radio Unit Pacific; contributions to ULTRA; and the Maritime Unit of the Office of Strategic Services. The Coast Guard's contribution to the latter effort was barely noted in the official history of OSS written after the war's end.^a This article is intended to illuminate this little known aspect of intelligence history.

Since its inception, the Coast Guard has been involved in the collection and maintenance of information that might today be equated to intelligence. In performing duties involving the security of the homeland, the Coast Guard has charted local coastlines and collected information on the movement of ships and other vessels, ship manifests, cargoes, and crews, most of which was passed to customs collectors in ports and to Treasury Department headquarters. More than 122 customs inspectors and surveyors and 10 revenue cutters in ports up and down the coast of the young United States supplied Treasury Secretary Alexander

a. Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS* (Government Printing Office, 1949). Originally classified Top Secret, the book was partially declassified in 1976 and reprinted commercially. One declassified version was published by Walker and Co. of New York with an introduction by the historian of WW II intelligence Anthony Cave Brown.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

A Quick Look at Coast Guard History

1790: Founded as the Revenue Marine Service by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton to “combat illicit shipping in and out of US ports and along US coasts.”

1791–1801: In a quasi-war with France, revenue cutters organized as a naval force alongside privateers and later the US Navy. Revenue cutters captured 18 of 22 French vessels it attacked.

1789–1862: Revenue cutters took part in efforts to suppress slave trade after its abolition in 1808.

War of 1812: Cutter Jefferson made the first capture of a British war ship of the war. After the war revenue cutters were used to chase down pirate ships in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean and to identify pirate strongholds.

1836–42 and 1846–48: The Revenue Marine Service was engaged in the Seminole War and Mexican War, respectively.

1861–65: Most cutters sided with the North and were used to blockade southern ports.

1915: Life Saving Service combined with Revenue Cutter Service to form the modern day Coast Guard. New service officially included a “chief intelligence officer.”

1917–18: During WW I the Coast Guard, attached to the Department of the Navy, did patrol and convoy duty and had the highest percentage loss of life among among military services.

1941–45: During World War II, the Coast Guard engaged in large range of actions, including first contact with the enemy before Pearl Harbor and seizure of German radio installations in Greenland. It was also involved in amphibious landings in both theaters.

Moments in Coast Guard Intelligence History

1904: The Coast Guard pioneered ship to shore radio communication, which later became the foundation for HF/DF, often referred to as Huff-Duff, communications intercepts during the Rum War and World War II.

1915: The law establishing the modern Coast Guard authorized “securing of information which is essential to the Coast Guard in carrying out its duties; for the dissemination of this information to responsible officers, operating units of the Coast Guard, the Treasury Department and other collaborating agencies; and the maintenance of adequate files and records of law enforcement activities.” The duties of the intelligence officers included “obtaining and disseminating to proper officials information of the plans and movements of vessels and persons engaged and suspected of being engaged in the violation of laws, the enforcement of which is charged to the US Coast Guard.” Additional language stated that the Coast Guard would be constituted as part of the military forces and operate as part of the Navy in time of war or when the president shall so direct.

Hamilton “an unending stream of intelligence.”^a In effect, Hamilton possessed an overt human information and intelligence collection system that spanned the entire length of the eastern seaboard and into the Caribbean.

This type of collection took on an almost modern appearance when, during the War of 1812, the officer commanding the defenses of Wilmington during the British blockade of Delaware Bay issued instructions—collection guidance today—to the revenue cutter General Green to obtain information on the size and disposition of the blockading squadron, the involvement of local pilots, landings on the bay’s shores, the status of provisioning and water, and so on. The order also instructed the cutter to get information about British behavior from local watermen and to examine local boats for British contraband and collaborators.

This combination of information gathering, scouting, and reporting would form the foundation not only for how information was collected and organized in ports across the United States but also dictated the conduct of law enforcement intelligence collection until Prohibition and the war against the rum runners in the early 1920’s, when the use of HF/DF spotting and location technology introduced an early form of COMINT to the Coast Guard and US intelligence. These practices ideally placed the Coast Guard in a position to respond to executive orders President Franklin Roosevelt issued in 1941, before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor, to bring the Coast

a. Ron Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 341.

Guard into a wartime footing under US Navy command.

Guardian Spies of WW II

The Coast Guard would have myriad duties under the Navy that would eventually involve it with Colonel Donovan as Coordinator of Information and later as the head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The history of OSS has been well documented. What remains little known, however, is the relationship between OSS and the Coast Guard, including the formerly classified history of the use of Coast Guard signals intelligence; Coast Guard men attached to OSS West Coast Schools and Training; Domestic Coordination at Area D on the Potomac River using the Coast Guard's Captain of the Port authority for "protection zones"; and the secret "Philadelphia Plan" designed to use OSS personnel to train the newly formed Coast Guard Auxiliary for antisabotage operations at East coast ports.

In these maritime activities, Coast Guard men recruited for their swimming, diving, boathandling, and signaling skills were at the heart of the OSS Maritime Unit (MU) and Operational Swimmer Group (OSG) operations. After they were organized and trained, these men were deployed with the OSS MU to Europe and the

China, Burma, India (CBI) Theater of Operations and to the Navy's Underwater Demolition Team 10 in the Pacific.

By August 1944, OSS had 226 men assigned to its Maritime Unit.^a Of these, according to declassified personnel rosters, almost 75 were from the Coast Guard. Another 40 were attached to the West Coast training schools.^b This small contingent was part of the largest expansion of the Coast Guard in its history, one that transformed the small peacetime Coast Guard fleet into a force of "160,000 men, manning 30 destroyer escorts, 75 frigates, 750 cutters, 290 Navy vessels, and 255 Army vessels, among scores of smaller craft."

The Creation of Area D and a New Marine Section

It took nearly 17 months for the OSS Maritime Unit to move from conception in early 1942 to its first operational assignment in Europe in late July 1943. During this time a British naval officer, CDR B.G.A. Woolley, was brought in to organize and train its operatives. According to a history of the Maritime Unit prepared late in the war by its chief:

Comdr. Woolley was assigned by General Donovan to assist in a study of British methods of training operatives and raiding forces. Thus far in the war, the

British had been conspicuously successful in infiltrating agents by sea and executing acts of maritime sabotage. Details of their equipment and experience were obtained by Comdr. Woolley and in great part formed a basis for O.S.S. future maritime activities.^c

A location on the Potomac River, designated Area D, had been acquired for Woolley's activities—even before a unit was officially established. The site was located in an area of about 1,200 acres just south of Quantico, Virginia, with roughly two miles of water frontage on the south bank of the river.

Because his marine section was not officially a stand-alone branch of OSS, CDR Woolley had to "beg, borrow, and steal" necessary resources for his start-up operation. He did not get control of the grounds from the OSS component that had controlled it until March 1943, along with supplies and equipment.^d

Cabin cruisers had to be acquired for training. Their acquisition was no small matter because the Coast Guard and the Navy had already acquired many cabin cruisers suitable for service at the beginning of the war, and a shortage existed. OSS had to conduct an extensive search to identify vessels 70–90 feet in length for its purposes.

a. LT Dennis Roberts, USN, "Maritime Unit History," 1944. The history was compiled for Roosevelt's OSS history project. The declassified report is in the possession of Mr. Tom Hawkins of the Naval Special Warfare Foundation. Provided to author via e-mail on 22 January 2007.

b. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), West Coast Training Center (WCTC), Roster of Station Compliment, Avalon, CA, 2 April 1945 and OSS WCTC Memorandum titled "Present Status of Boat Division Personnel," dated 13 February 1945. LCDR Howard Shelby (USCGR) listed as Command of Boats and Crews with an additional 35 Coast Guard men assigned under his command. National Archives College Park, M: , Record Group 226-134- 8 accessed by author on 21 July 2007. OSS Detachment 404 Headquarters South East Asia Command, "Personnel Roster" ated 1 March 1945. National Archives College Park, MD: Record Group 226-165A-5-9. Roster listed Coast Guard officers and enlisted men attached to 404.

c. Roberts, "Maritime Unit History."

d. Ibid., Chapter 1.

OSS files show that this process took about 10 months.

Navy and Coast Guard officers eventually identified two suitable cabin cruisers, the *Maribel* and the *Marsyl*, which were licensed by Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) authority, and slots at local marinas and yacht clubs in the DC area were obtained. In addition, the boats received special COTP protection for maritime training missions, which often were conducted at night and inevitably looked suspicious.

As intensive training was about to begin in the summer of 1943, CDR Woolley worked with Washington area Coast Guard Captain of the Port H.G. Hemmingway to establish special protection zones for maritime training, obtain documentation, and provide security. These pioneering arrangements and the training practices CDR Woolley imported became the foundation for clandestine maritime training in the United States. The training center also went on to pioneer new equipment and methods in the maritime environment that were exported to several theaters between 1943 and 1945.

The arrangements lasted until late in 1943, when new training sites were located and camps organized. In November 1943, a Special Maritime Unit, consisting of approximately 40 officers and men was recruited and commenced training at Camp Pendleton, California. By this time, Donovan had approved the use of

OSS Maritime Unit Chronology

(From Roosevelt's War Report)

Feb 42: British Naval Officer (presumably Woolley) loaned to OSS

Aug 42: First maritime operations training class begun.

20 Jan 43: Marine Section established.

18 Feb 43: Underwater swimming groups okayed by Donovan.

24 May 43: First underwater swim training in Annapolis.

9 Jun 43: Maritime Unit formalized.

July 43: First MU officer dispatched to run caique service for clandestine supply and infiltration.

Coast Guard men for OSS operation, moving the OSS–Coast Guard relationship from one of cooperation to participation.

The warm water off southern California had a great deal to do with the decision to relocate phases of MU training from the East to the West Coast. In February 1944, another camp was established on Catalina Island. Two months later, in May, a training base was set up in Nassau, British Bahamas, after tests proved that these warm waters and exceptional weather conditions made it ideal for swimming exercises. Severe pollution in the Potomac was also a factor in relocating swimming activity.

From Coordination to Frogmen: Becoming Operational

Coast Guard involvement in operations had been formally broached in a 3 September 1943 confidential letter from chief of OSS Special Operations CAPT Carl O. Hoffman (USA) to CAPT Ward Davis (USN), chief of OSS Naval Command. Captain Hoffman stated:

I have proposed to the General [Donovan] the use of Coast Guardsmen for OSS work.... The reason for the proposal is that most Coast Guardsmen are well trained in communications and incidentally trained in the use of sidearms. If wherever possible we can draw our men from the Coast Guard we have gained in time as more than half their training is complete.... Many of the Coast Guardsmen are likewise trained in Small Boat Handling which will prove useful in an emergency.^a

This letter was critical in moving the organizational relationship between the Coast Guard and OSS from one of coordination to full use of Coast Guard men in all aspects of MU training, education, mission support, and operations, including those involving the Operational Swimmer Groups.

When OSS asked the Coast Guard to provide personnel for its operational swimmer program, it got a mixed response. The assistant commandant of the Coast Guard, RADM L. T. Chalker, wrote to the executive officer of the OSS, LTC O.C. Doering, that the Coast Guard could

a. CAPT Ward Davis (USN) letter to CAPT Carl O. Hoffman (USA), 3 September 1943. National Archives, College Park, MD. Record Group 226-Entry No. 146ABox 14. War Report of the OSS stated that "OSS Naval Com was responsible for the recruitment, processing and management of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Personnel. Officers were administratively detailed to OSS as an activity of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations; enlisted men were nominally assigned to the Potomac River Naval Command. In May 1943, when OSS Naval Command was established, the orders of all officers and enlisted men were amended to specify assignment to it.... The Naval Liaison Officer in the OSS Nav Com was the official contact between the branches of OSS and various naval intelligence units."

not provide the number of officers requested:

For some time the Coast Guard has been faced with an acute officer situation which has been brought about by manning a considerable number of Naval craft in addition to taking care of our own expanding needs. For this reason the Commandant is loath to make any commitments involving officer personnel.

Enlisted men could be detailed, however. The Coast Guard

will make available the enlisted men asked for.... It is regrettable that circumstances make it inadvisable to supply the officer personnel as the Coast Guard always has tried to cooperate with the [Office of Strategic] Services whenever it has been able to do so.^a

In the end, a few officers were assigned to OSS duty. But these men had leadership roles: LCDR Howard Shelby and CWO Wilfred Keil commanded boats and crews at West Coast Schools and Training at Camp Pendleton; LT John Booth became the commander of OSG II in the CBI Theater; CWO Thomas Medlicott also in OSG II; CWO Robert Butt led a landing unit and OSG III in the South East Asia Command (SEAC); and ENS Arthur Garrett led OSG I and UDT 10 in the Pacific.

The men recruited for OSS MU operations were trained and worked in joint teams that combined Coast

The Security Arrangements

Classified letters exchanged on 15 June and 16 June 1943 between Captain Hemmingway and Commander Woolley outline the coordination arrangements.^a

Commander Woolley to Captain Hemmingway, 15 June 1943:

“It would be appreciated if you would kindly issue the necessary permit for the vessel to pass up and down the river Potomac while she is in government service with the Office of Strategic Services. The work performed by the vessel is of a secret nature which has been explained to your predecessor”

Captain Hemmingway to Commander Woolley, 16 June 1943:

Agreeable to your request of this date, a renewed license for the MARIBEL to cruise the Potomac River is enclosed herewith. This office will depend on you personally to comply with the first paragraph of your letter of this date, in case it becomes necessary to do so [regarding transfer of the MARIBEL from government service]. In case of your detachment from your present duty it is requested that you bind your successor to the same requirements”

On 17 June, CAPT S. E. Barron, Chief of Staff for the Coast Guard District Potomac River Naval Command, sent Commander Woolley a copy of the protection order stating that:

The “MARIBEL,” a flush-deck type gas screw motor yacht, 66.8 feet in length, 16.3 beam, official number 2251123, is engaged in special government work. Patrol vessels of the Coast Guard Patrol Base, Washington, are to give her free passage and are not to board her. She operates often at night, blacked out, in the vicinity of Clifton Beach. Such patrol vessel commanders are to bear this in mind and are to keep clear of her. In directing other vessels, such patrol commanders, shall see that such vessels stay clear of her.”

a. All cited exchanges can be found in National Archives, College Park, MD: Record Group 226-328-92-9


Guard, Navy, Army, and Marine Corp counterparts. The graphic on the following page, taken from the declassified Maritime Unit Manual of June 1945, highlights the recruitment and training of men from all military services, including the Coast Guard.

In his Maritime Unit History, Lieutenant Roberts noticeably overlooks (as did Roosevelt) the Coast Guard contribution, writing, “On August 31, 1944, the date which marks the close of this history, the

Maritime Unit had total personnel of 226. These included: Officers and enlisted men, Army-60; Navy 143; and Marines-19. In addition, there were 4 civilians.”^b Declassified records, however, clearly highlight the role of Coast Guard men, who, as of August 1944, constituted almost a third of the Maritime Unit and almost half of the 143 Navy men Lieutenant Roberts counted as “Navy” personnel, most likely because of Executive Order 8895, which attached the Coast Guard to Navy for the duration of the war.

a. Letter from RADM L.T. Chalker, Assistant Commandant USCG to LTC O.C. Doering, Executive Officer of OSS in reply to a request for additional officer personnel. National Archives Record Group 226, Entry No. 136, Box 133, File 1418 (accessed by author 28 February 2008).

b. Roberts, “Maritime Unit History.”



The Final Test: Operation Cincinnati

Operation Cincinnati was a full-scale exercise conducted by LT John Booth's OSG II, just after it completed its team training in Nassau. The objective of the exercise was to penetrate US Navy harbor defenses in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and just before OSG II deployed to CBI. The exercise served both to test Navy defenses and to evaluate the effectiveness of the new group's ability to conduct reconnaissance, infiltration, and sabotage operations from the sea before it was to deploy to Asia in the fall of 1944.

As the leader of an attacking "Red Group," Lieutenant Booth was in command of the operation, including the assault group and the mother ship. According to the operational-order for the exercise, each man of the Red Group

shall be equipped with wrist watch, waterproof compass, sheath knife, fins, sneakers, and face plates. Each group shall carry waterproof flashlights. Each anchorage detail... shall carry M-3's in waterproof covers. Anchorage detail of Red shall carry sidearms. Waterproofing of all demolitions shall be inspected by LT French (USA).^a

The exercise was the first of its kind in an actual maritime environment and took place almost 40 years before the Navy commissioned a US Navy officer from SEAL Team Six to set up Red Cell teams in 1984 to ascertain the Navy's vulnerability to terrorist attacks.

Roosevelt gave Operation Cincinnati a good evaluation in his War Report:

In these tests, the lengthy training showed commendable results, because the swimmers were able to circumvent the net defenses in each instance. An additional point of value was proof that the Navy sound detection gear did not reveal the presence of underwater swimmers.^b

Operation Cincinnati also provided proof of concept for equipment to be used in forthcoming undersea warfare operations. One key piece of equipment was an underwater breathing apparatus invented by Dr. Christian Lambertsen.^c Although other self-contained diving equipment was under development, the Lambertsen Rebreathing Unit (LARU) was the first unassisted diving capability employed operationally by the United States. It allowed MU swimmers to stay under water at a depth to 50 feet for as long as 90 minutes, allowing time to swim almost a mile.

Other significant contributions included development of the two-man kayak, two-man surfboard, and use of the British submersible unit referred to as the "Sleeping Beauty," which enabled swimmers silently to move agents past enemy defenses in either infiltration or exfiltration operations.

a. Operation Cincinnati OORDER.

b. Roosevelt, *War Report*, 227.

c. Lambertsen was more than an inventor. He was also the mentor and trainer for OSS Maritime Unit personnel. In the year 2000, Dr. Lambertsen was designated as the Father of US Combat Swimming by the Navy's UDT/SEAL community. His life's work has included significant contributions to the US Coast Guard Air/Sea Rescue Program, Navy SEALs, the US Army, and NASA. He is the creator of most of the technology used for Combat Swimming Operations in the United States today.



Operational Swimmer Group II, a truly joint force, shown in Cuba in 1944. Unit commander, LT John Booth, is standing at the far left. Of the 32 men posing in this image, 16 were members of the Coast Guard. Of the remainder, seven were from the Army, five from the Navy, and four from the Marine Corps. The dog's service of origin is unknown. Photo Source: RM1/C John Harrigan (USCGR).

Field Operations

Europe

In January 1944, the first Maritime Unit members began to deploy to Europe and CBI. In the Mediterranean, highly successful clandestine ferrying operations were carried out in the Aegean Sea, as agents and supplies were landed and downed fliers and refugees evacuated. In Italy the MU supported the operations of the Italian amphibious group, the San Marco Battalion (see text box), and trained in maritime sabotage and sneak attack operations; in the United Kingdom, MU coordinated the use of PT boats and submarine chasers.¹⁴ L-Unit I and II were part of the original MU Operational Swimmer training that began earlier in the war and deployed to the UK and European Theater of operations during January–June of 1944.

China, Burma, India


In January 1944, after training in Coronado, the Bahamas, and Guantánamo Bay, OSG II deployed to Burma, Ceylon, and Kandy as part of Detachment 101 and Detachment 404 of the OSS (January 1944–April 1945). The “Arakan Field Unit” was a combination of OSS Operational Group and MU men in which the latter were to provide coastal intelligence to the British-led XV Indian Corps for an advance south along the Burmese coast and to provide maritime services to all branches in theater.

OSG III trained in the Bahamas and deployed to Ceylon, the Southeast Asia Command, and Detachment 101 (October 1944–January 1945). By 1944 and early 1945 many of the Coast Guard men attached to the MU were deployed to

the OSS missions and sub-missions in both theaters of the war.

One example of the many operations conducted in CBI was an operation called “Cleveland” on 25 January 1945. Although many of the missions conducted by OSGs were dangerous and often far behind enemy lines, Operation Cleveland was nevertheless unique in that its objectives were to obtain intelligence of a target area; to capture a native for the purposes of interrogation; and to ascertain generally, enemy strength in the area.^a Several men of OSG II, including LT Booth and Chief James Eubank of the Coast Guard were involved (the two are shown returning in the image to the right).¹⁴ An enemy agent was, in fact, captured, exfiltrated, and interrogated by OSS personnel. In addition, a survey of the coastline, terrain, and

a. Operational Summary for Operation Cleveland. National Archives Record Group 226. File labeled SEAC Operations.



This map from Kermit Roosevelt’s declassified War Report illustrates the importance of maritime operations in the Scandinavian region.

status of enemy forces was accomplished for the commander of CBI.^a

Of the 22 missions listed in the Maritime Unit Diary, Coast Guard men participated in all but two. The chief of the Maritime Unit in the China, Burma, India Theater said in his July 1945 report to OSS HQ in Washington DC that:

enough cannot be said in the praise of these [Coast Guard] men and the remainder of the group which joined on 13

January [1945], for the spirit in which they took up their new assignment and the cooperation and loyalty that they gave us. Their lot was not an easy one, but their previous training proved invaluable. They were engaged in the infiltration of agents where the existence of the enemy was known and in working their way many miles into enemy lines through mangrove swamps under enemy outposts, and dodging enemy M.L’s. We can be thankful that

no men were lost through enemy action.^b

Conclusion

A Past Finally Recognized

The Coast Guard men attached to the OSS during World War II all are part of the long blue line of Coast Guard history. But even more, they helped lay the foundation for future Coast Guard operations and for defense organizations yet to come. The training, tactics and procedures pioneered by the OSS MU and OSGs of which Coast Guard men were such a big part would help build the foundation for future covert diving operations, US Navy SEALs concepts, and Special Operations Command combat swimming operations. Indeed, in a ceremony at the Special Forces Command in 1998, the Coast Guard frogmen and the men of the OSS Maritime Unit were inducted as honorary members of the Special Forces, more than 50 years after their service in war.

Looking Ahead

In the summer of 2007 the Coast Guard reestablished, for the first time since WW II, the intelligence specialty for enlisted personnel and brought into the Coast Guard people who specialize in all-source, human, communications, signals, and counterintelligence missions. The Coast Guard’s new cryptologic program is the service cryptologic element for the Department of Homeland Security, and, under revisions to

a. Interview of LT John Booth by author, April 2006, confirmed in interview with Maj. Christian Lambertsen, October 2006.

b. National Archives. OSS Files. Record Group 226, Entry No. 549, Box 92, File 13. “Burma War Diary.” Drafted by LT Jon Babb, Chief Maritime Unit, India, Burma Theater. July 1945. The “Burma War Diary” provides a summary of the activities of the MU in Burma, listing names, missions and responsibilities of the men conducting covert and sabotage operations in that theater up until the MU received orders to disband on 15 June 1944.

Executive Order 12333 introduced by President Bush in July 2008, intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Coast Guard were authorized to:

- Collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence including defense and defense-related information and intelligence to support national and departmental missions;
- Conduct counterintelligence activities;
- Monitor the development, procurement, and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment;
- Conduct related research, development, and test and evaluation activities; and
- Conduct foreign intelligence liaison relationships and intelligence exchange programs with foreign intelligence services, security services, or international organizations.

Until the reintroduction of the intelligence speciality, intelligence duties were often performed by officers and enlisted personnel from other specialties in the service, a policy that left the Coast Guard at a disadvantage in building long-term expertise to perform national intelligence duties.

Excerpt from OSS War Report on Maritime Unit Operations with San Marco Battalion in Europe^a

In February 1944 an arrangement had been concluded between OSS and the Duke of Aosta to make available to OS the techniques and services of the Italian San Marco Battalion, an elite corps of Italian naval personnel specializing in amphibious operations and maritime sabotage. A volunteer group of five officers and 50 men from the battalion was assigned to OSS, along with the latest items of Italian maritime equipment. Included were swimming gear, two man “mattresses” with silent electric motors to permit clandestine landings, and other assault, reconnaissance, and demolitions equipment.

The San Marco were placed under the direction of OSS Maritime Unit Branch personnel. In May, they were based at Fasano, south of Bari, subsequently moved to Falconara, north of Ancona, and after the capture of Ravenna in December 1944, set up an advance base near that city. US PTs and British MTBs were used alternately with Italian MAS or MS boats under British Navy control. By the spring of 1945, the MU staff had been reconstituted as the Maritime Detachment of Company D and had added various locally procured fishing craft and speedboats to its equipment.

The first mission took place on 19 June 1944, a sabotage operation that succeeded in blowing a railroad bridge along the coast 100 miles behind enemy lines. A second such operation was carried out late in July. In the August month period, the first operation for intelligence purposes was run, at Eighth Army request, to exfiltrate agents and an Italian with plans and photographs of a section of the Gothic Line in the Pesaro region. Several carefully briefed partisan guides and San Marco officers were infiltrated and returned successfully four days later. The material reached the Eighth Army four days before its attack on the Gothic Line in the Pesaro Sector.

A total of 10 clandestine maritime patrols on Lake Comacchio were accomplished, several small islands in the lake occupied, and a series of small offensive forays run against the enemy-held northern shore of the lake. By mid-April, partisan groups south of Chioggia were contacted and, with the more clement spring weather conditions, rapidly supplied both by air and by sea. Several other operations were run jointly with an Eighth Army detachment to infiltrate and recover agents and couriers.

a. Roosevelt, *War Report*, 228–29

Ironically, the reinvigoration of intelligence responsibilities in the Coast Guard since 9/11 has almost brought the Coast Guard back to its intelligence related work of WW II. In the summer of 2008, the commandant of

the Coast Guard announced a partnership with Naval Special Warfare in which Coast Guard men will be trained as US Navy SEALs.

The original guardian spies would be pleased.^a



a. Readers can find more detail, including a bibliography of literature on the Coast Guard and its historical role at: www.uscg.mil/history and www.guardianspies.com.

Former Intelligence Officer Responds to *The Fourth Man*

Dr. Richard Rita

What I write below is from memory and is not a chapter-and-verse book review, nor is it a response to all of Baer's assertions in his many public comments . . . I will point out the book's key factual errors, which render it an unreliable account of what actually happened in the GRAYSUIT investigation.

In his book, *The Fourth Man: The Hunt for a KGB Spy at the Top of the CIA and the Rise of Putin's Russia* (Hatchette Books, 2022), and in numerous subsequent media engagements, Robert Baer purports to tell the story of CIA's hunt in the mid-to-late 1990s for another highly damaging Russian mole in its ranks in the aftermath of the February 1994 arrest of Aldrich Ames. It is based primarily on a few key named sources, retired CIA and FBI counterintelligence officers who had some involvement with the investigation, as well as the usual panoply of anonymous sources and outside observers and experts cited in books of this type. Baer paints an ugly picture of an aborted investigation hamstrung by careerist senior officers and sabotaged from the inside by the very mole the investigators were looking for. He all but asserts that this mole, who has never been officially identified and caught, is none other than Paul Redmond, the CIA's legendary, decorated spy catcher and the senior CIA manager of counterintelligence during this time.

I have never talked to Baer, but I can speak with some authority about the joint CIA-FBI investigation looking for this Russian mole. In June 1995, I joined CIA's Special Investigations Unit (SIU), which was charged with working with the FBI to find a Russian penetration of CIA. I was an active participant in this espionage investigation codenamed GRAYSUIT until FBI Supervisory Special Agent Robert Hanssen was

uncovered as a Russian spy and arrested in February 2001. I served as the chief of SIU during 2008–14 and had access to all its historical and contemporary records. After I retired in 2014, I wrote for CIA a highly classified, in-house history of the SIU from its pre-Ames antecedents until Hanssen's arrest. It includes a detailed discussion of the GRAYSUIT investigation.

What I write below is from memory and is not a chapter-and-verse book review, nor is it a response to all of Baer's assertions in his many public comments about his book. I do not address events in the book completely outside my knowledge, such as the alleged unsanctioned and likely quite illegal espionage investigation conducted by some of the author's sources under the witting protection of a CIA division chief. I will point out the book's key factual errors, which render it an unreliable account of what actually happened in the GRAYSUIT investigation during the period Baer covered. I also show how these errors fatally undercut the book's sensationalist implication that Paul Redmond was probably a Russian mole, Baer's "Fourth Man."

Claim: Management Balked and SIU Sputtered, Thanks to the Mole

Baer claims that CIA senior management in the early-to-mid-1990s was reluctant to pursue the

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

investigation into a reported Russian penetration of CIA more damaging than Aldrich Ames. Moreover, the author asserts that SIU was marginalized or effectively disbanded in November 1994, and that source reporting was withheld from it—both developments allegedly masterminded by Redmond trying to hamstring the investigation because he was the mole.

The Facts

CIA management was seized with finding the reported mole “more damaging than Ames” and provided resources to do so. To assert otherwise is false. Redmond was the key CIA senior working to secure those resources. When I arrived in SIU in June 1995, it was my job as a senior analyst to work with the FBI squad and CIA officers assigned to GRAYSUIT. I was part of an almost tripling of specially vetted personnel assigned to SIU—an augmentation agreed upon by senior CIA and FBI management in November 1994 to reinforce the investigation and work with new information about this penetration and on other cases. I and others had access to all espionage reporting from sources that included “Max,” Baer’s key source for the mole hunt, as well as access to FBI investigatory results. SIU was hardly marginalized, shut down, relegated to researching dusty historical files, or denied access to any contemporary reporting in November 1994.

Claim: Off-the-Books Agents Were Run by the Mole

Baer alleges that Redmond ran “back-pocket agents” in the mid-1990s, whose information was denied

to SIU or shaped by him to minimize any connection to him as the mole.

The Facts

CIA and FBI investigators, myself included, had access to all information from any source bearing on the GRAYSUIT case, including from the purported “back-pocket agents” as well as other reporting sources. I and others developed intelligence requirements for agent meetings and worked with raw reporting, not massaged information. This included being briefed on the details surrounding the collection of that reporting—something rarely allowed. We operated in a highly compartmented world where information was strictly controlled and limited to a small group of operators, analysts, and investigators. This is not back-pocket agency; this is topnotch case security against a hard target that may be secretly operating within your organization.

Redmond at the time was the CIA’s senior manager overseeing the GRAYSUIT investigation, among others. I personally briefed him and, on a regular basis, wrote highly compartmented assessments on developments in GRAYSUIT and other investigations that were circulated to Redmond and other witting CIA seniors. This included on occasion the Director of Central Intelligence. My analysis was shaped in the normal and regular analytical debates the GRAYSUIT team had about source reporting, the importance of specific lead elements, and their application to specific investigation candidates.

Claim: Only One Person Fit the Lead Very Well and Was Protected by the Russians

Baer asserts Redmond was singularly positioned to fit the investigative lead elements and the Russians went to great efforts, including perhaps sacrificing assets, to protect him as their source.

The Facts

The investigation’s candidate matrix comprised dozens of CIA officers, and that list regularly changed because of new information, investigation results, or revised analytical conclusions. This was an iterative process conducted by several FBI and SIU officers like myself in ad hoc discussions, scheduled reviews, and off-site meetings. Redmond was indeed a primary matrix candidate as a result of his access to compromised cases and his connections to other lead elements. But so were other senior- and mid-level CIA Russia operations and counterintelligence officers, some of whom would fit as well or better than Redmond in the rankings as we worked through the information. This phenomenon was true for most of our espionage investigations.

What distinguished Redmond and other senior matrix candidates from the beginning, however, was the fact that they had access to ongoing Russia source reporting across the board and knowledge of a host of sensitive CIA cases and operations directed at the Russia target (and others). Contrary to Baer’s claim, people working Russia operations and counterintelligence were not blind to developments in and about Russia. Quite the opposite. As a rule, we regarded the successful running and importance of these foreign intelligence

and counterintelligence assets, cases, and operations as a critical exculpatory factor in investigations.

Most critically for GRAYSUIT, Redmond knew the identity of all the sources helping us with that investigation. One can go through all the wilderness-of-mirrors explanations as to why Redmond, if he were the mole, would not compromise these sources to the Russians to save his skin, but experience shows that penetration agents go to extraordinary lengths to neutralize such dire threats to their security. Ames and Hanssen certainly did so. Perhaps the most well-known historical case of how far a threatened penetration will go is Kim Philby's betrayal of Konstantin Volkov.^a

So how does Baer explain how important cases survived if Redmond was reporting to Moscow? You can, as Baer does, conduct all the convoluted analysis you want in trying to explain why the Russians would compromise an active, important CIA penetration agent like Jim Nicholson to protect Redmond or any asset, but the reality is that they don't. You can try to explain away, as the author does, the Russians' willingness to let secrets hemorrhage, but not the secrets that were actually hemorrhaging if Redmond compromised our knowledge about them to the Russians.

Finally, you can try to find a psychological reason for Redmond's or any agent's unwillingness to compromise CIA or FBI sources and programs for fear he would be on an investigation short list. Indeed, that sometimes happens. Inevitably, though, a spy's reasons

for spying—money, self-esteem, ideology, revenge—win out and the spy gives up the crown jewels of their access and knowledge. In short, spies spy and work to remove obstacles and threats to their spying. As part of our normal analytic process, we considered all the above possibilities; we didn't simply disregard them out of hand. In my experience, it turns out that Occam's Razor is a valuable approach, even in counterintelligence.

Claim: The Mole Maneuvered the Removal of Those Closing in on Him

Baer asserts that the SIU's first chief, Laine Bannerman, was cashiered and two other SIU officers were purged from the unit in a defensive move allegedly engineered by Redmond shortly after, in November 1994, they provided senior CIA and FBI counterintelligence officers including Redmond, a profile of the mole they knew pointed directly at him and would be seen as such by the others being briefed.

The Facts

Let's set aside the incredulity of professional mole-hunters knowingly alerting the person they believed was the mole that he had been uncovered. Let's also let pass the stunner that senior FBI and CIA counterintelligence officers would not follow up on a briefing that all but identified that mole literally sitting in their midst.

Bannerman never fully accepted that the rules for mole hunts had changed after Ames. Both CIA and FBI had been severely criticized by

Congress for not working together to find the cause of the disastrous Russian agent losses in the 1980s until 1991 (when Redmond revived the moribund CIA investigation and convinced FBI to join the effort). Presidential Decision Directive 24 in May 1994 reiterated that the FBI was the lead agency for espionage investigations and mandated that a senior FBI officer head the Counterespionage Group (CEG).

Bannerman and the other officers did not leave SIU until fall 1995, almost a year after this alleged briefing and after SIU was expanded and given more resources. Bannerman was replaced as chief because of a well-documented dispute with her immediate supervisors, Ed Curran (from FBI) and Cindy Webb (CIA), the chief and deputy chief of CEG, respectively, over the handling of source reporting and SIU's role in FBI espionage investigations. CEG was the element in the Counterintelligence Center charged with identifying foreign penetrations of the US government and its allies.

When I arrived in SIU in June 1995, Bannerman was locked in a struggle with the leadership over unilaterally holding back CIA information from FBI, which FBI thought relevant to its investigations, and refusing to accept FBI's primacy over SIU in CIA-FBI espionage investigations. In late summer, at Bannerman's request, she and other SIU officers, myself included, met with the chief of the CIC and our CEG supervisors. Bannerman had requested the meeting to complain about the FBI's handling of CIA source information (which she

a. An NKVD agent, Volkov was a would-be defector who could have revealed Philby's spying for Moscow. After Volkov approached the British embassy in Istanbul in August 1945, Philby betrayed him. Volkov was detained and returned to the USSR, where he presumably was executed.

strongly thought threatened source security), FBI's treatment of SIU, and her immediate supervisors' unwillingness to do anything about these issues. She asked the chief of CIC to resubordinate SIU directly under his control.

Not long after the meeting, she received her answer—she was replaced as SIU chief. As a result, the two putatively purged officers, who strongly supported her views, decided to leave as well. The departure of all three had everything to do with policy disagreements and bureaucratic relationships, and nothing to do with a mole's machinations at self-protection. It was open, I saw it, and it's in the official record.

After Bannerman's removal, a new chief was assigned and, over the next few years under her management, SIU worked on a number of Russian penetration cases, achieving notable success in uncovering as Russian spies CIA officer Harold "Jim" Nicholson and GRAYSUIT subject Hanssen.

Conclusion

Lastly, I'd like to address the term "Fourth Man." At no time prior to Hanssen's arrest in February 2001 was the FBI or SIU looking for a Fourth Man. It was looking for the GRAYSUIT subject based on lead information provided by Max and others, going back to 1993. From late 1996 to late 2000, the GRAYSUIT team believed CIA officer Brian Kelley was that subject. The team was horribly wrong. Later information added to the GRAYSUIT lead

matrix conclusively showed that the Russian mole CIA and FBI had been looking for in CIA since 1993 was, in fact, Hanssen. There is absolutely no doubt on this score.

"Fourth Man" was an unofficial term used by some counterintelligence officers in the post-Hanssen-arrest period who believed there were several compromises and other counterintelligence discrepancies that could not be explained by Edward Lee Howard, Ames, and Hanssen. Indeed, after successful espionage investigations and the debrief of a turncoat, there are almost always lead items that are still unexplained. Those unexplained lead items sometimes become the basis of a follow-on investigation. This occurred after the GRAYSUIT case in 2001.

By the mid-2000s, however, SIU had concluded that there was no Fourth Man hiding in the leftovers of GRAYSUIT, having found solid answers to non-Hanssen-related leads, some mentioned by Baer, and having not received any further source reporting deemed reliable on the matter. This did not mean there were (then or subsequently) no other Russian penetrations of the CIA. As Redmond himself reminded those of us working in the counterespionage field, it is "an actuarial certainty" that foreign intelligence agencies have penetrated CIA.

When I was chief of SIU, the unit continued to work diligently on Russian espionage cases with the FBI, however tenuous or strong the

leads were. A Fourth Man investigation was not among them. I am very skeptical, therefore, about Baer's assertions in the book and in interviews that the FBI has had an active investigation on a Fourth Man since the mid-2000s.

Of course, I cannot say what espionage investigations are, or may have been, under way involving SIU, let alone the FBI, since my retirement in 2014. (I subsequently worked off and on as a contractor in SIU until 2021.) I am dismayed, however, over Baer's statements after his book's publication that FBI supports the publication because it may shake loose a person in Moscow willing to sell what he knows about a Fourth Man. This, to me, suggests a foundering investigation, if one exists. Moreover, from a counterintelligence viewpoint, Baer's book may be more likely to shake loose a dangle or double agent controlled by Moscow and peddling disinformation.

Given the book's key factual errors, repeated and enhanced by the author in subsequent public comments, I consider *The Fourth Man* a fictionalized account of actual events—Baer himself calls it a "thriller"—peddling a sensationalist and slyly presented accusation aimed at a CIA counterintelligence legend. It is neither a reliable account of one of the greatest mole hunts in modern US counterintelligence history nor does it provide its readers with an accurate picture of modern counterespionage investigations and operations.



The reviewer: Dr. Richard Rita is a retired CIA counterintelligence officer.

Review Essay

Memoir of an Attorney General: One Damn Thing After Another, by William P. Barr

Mike R.

In June 1971, Barr began seasonal employment at CIA, while during the academic year he pursued a graduate degree at Columbia University. He said of this period: “My summers at the agency were some of the best times in my life.” He also lauded the environment to his professors in New York: “There’s more academic freedom at the CIA than at Columbia.”

As a high school junior, William Barr told his guidance counselor that he wanted to become director of CIA. If not for his mother and Stansfield Turner, he just might have done so.

One Damn Thing After Another (William Morrow, 2022—595 pages, illustrations, index) is the autobiography of President Donald J. Trump’s second attorney general, who led the Department of Justice (DoJ) from February 2019 to December 2020. Barr is only the second individual to reprise the role, having occupied the position during 1991–93. The book starts promisingly but grows uneven in its most anticipated section devoted to his service in the Trump era. It branches off onto numerous expositions about current sociocultural flash points, and Barr gives free rein to his opinionated commentary, which he holds more in check during depictions of the impressive buildup of his career up until that point.

While the book naturally is more focused on DoJ concerns, those with an interest in intelligence and national security will find these topics addressed regularly throughout its nearly 600 pages. A reader willing to overlook the memoir’s many downsides will come away with an enhanced appreciation for a consequential figure in two presidential administrations.

Intelligence Ties

Intelligence runs through Barr’s veins more than most people probably are aware, going back to his father Donald’s brief service in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. The younger Barr followed in his father’s footsteps at Columbia University and pursued a predetermined goal: “I want a career in intelligence.... My strategy is to make myself an attractive candidate by becoming an expert on China.” (27) Anticipating being drafted upon graduation in the early 1970s, he set his sights on a commission as a Navy intelligence officer, after which he would apply to CIA.

As it happened, Barr’s draft number made military service unlikely, and a CIA recruiter on campus suggested he apply for an internship. In June 1971, Barr began seasonal employment at CIA, while during the academic year he pursued a graduate degree at Columbia. He said of this period: “My summers at the agency were some of the best times in my life.” He also lauded the environment to his professors in New York: “There’s more academic freedom at the CIA than at Columbia.” (34)

A couple of years into his CIA career, he decided to get a law degree, heeding the advice of his mother to have a backup plan in case intelligence did not pan out. A

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

Barr's decision to abandon an intelligence career was motivated both by his increasing enjoyment of the law and his "lack of respect for Admiral Turner's leadership."

full-time employee by this point, he worked for the agency during the day while attending George Washington University Law School at night. He was in good company: "Many CIA veterans, including Allen Dulles, the first civilian director, had gone to GW night law school." (35) Part way into his law studies, the agency came under assault from a succession of scandals and investigations into allegations of abuse, prompted in large part by exposure of CIA's "Family Jewels" report of potential charter violations. Short on lawyers and in need of urgent help, CIA asked Barr to pivot assignments internally and assist the then Office of Legislative Counsel; he never looked back from this switch to the legal side.

Even though it would not be apparent until later, the stars came together for Barr in January 1976, when Langley welcomed incoming Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George H. W. Bush, who would profoundly influence Barr's career in the years to come. Working together on testimony for Capitol Hill, they bonded over a shared affinity for China—Bush had just come from Beijing, where he was chief of the US Liaison Office—and the DCI respected Barr's counsel. As Barr was entering his final year of law school, a classmate suggested he put in for a clerkship upon graduation, something he had not been considering as he was planning to remain at CIA afterward. Barr applied to work for a judge on the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, who, it turned out, was a friend of Bush's from his adopted home state of Texas. Bush strongly recommended Barr, who commenced clerking in mid-1977.

Barr's time away at the DC Circuit cemented views that had been building in the months since his benefactor's departure:

My plans for a career in the intelligence community changed abruptly, however, after President Ford lost reelection in November, Bush stepped down in January 1977, and President Jimmy Carter appointed a new director: Admiral Stansfield Turner. The admiral was a disaster. He arrived with a retinue of naval officers who served as an impregnable palace guard. CIA officials had to conduct business in writing through these naval officers. Turner treated agency professionals with distrust and disdain. Worst of all, he decimated the clandestine service. Turner, like many political appointees since, bought into the delusional belief that intelligence work can be conducted wholly by satellites and gizmos that don't require anyone's hands getting dirty. Agency morale plummeted. I was ready to leave in July when my clerkship started. (41)

Barr's decision to abandon an intelligence career was motivated both by his increasing enjoyment of the law and his "lack of respect for Admiral Turner's leadership." (43) Yet if unpleasant leadership were enough to drive him away from a relatively low-level job at CIA, it begs the question why 40 years later he would agree to work directly for President Trump, about whose management style he would acknowledge

many misgivings before accepting the offer. The book has a number of such internal inconsistencies, which stand in contrast to his presentation of an otherwise logical, determined, and principled life.

The author covers in the space of a few chapters what could have been an extensive memoir in its own right had it been written at the time: his rise in power culminating in service at the pinnacle of the legal profession under Bush 41. Even now, Barr seems mystified over this ascendance:

The journey to my first tour as Attorney General, at the age of forty-one, took many serendipitous twists and turns. How I went from being a China scholar to the government's top legal post in eighteen years still surprises me and was largely the result of chance—a sequence of coincidences. (10)

First Stint at DoJ

Contacts and coincidences certainly played a role, as they do in so many stories of success, but they would not have amounted to anything were it not for Barr's decision to dabble in the political sphere while at a Washington, D.C., law firm from the late 1970s through the late 1980s. He put his toe in the water assisting the transition team for incoming President Ronald Reagan in 1980; served more substantially on the White House Domestic Policy Council Staff in 1982–83; and again played a role on the transition staff in support of President-elect George H.W. Bush in 1988. This latter role led directly to him becoming assistant attorney general (AG) in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC),

the office responsible for providing legal opinions and advice to the president and the rest of the executive branch.

Barr says that Bush wanted him at OLC because he was looking for someone who shared his view of the need to restore the power of the chief executive. Bush had seen Barr in action at CIA in the mid-1970s when it and so much of the executive branch was under assault in the post-Watergate era and knew that Barr's thinking on executive strength had not changed.

As head of OLC, Barr promulgated two notable opinions that expanded the president's freedom of maneuver in the national security arena. His interpretation that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 limiting the role of the US military in domestic law enforcement did not apply extraterritorially opened the door to increased use of the military in overseas law-enforcement-like operations, particularly in counterterrorism and counternarcotics. His reversal of previously held interpretations regarding the practice of renditions—snatching an individual in another country without that country's permission—increased the use of this practice.

Referring to his time heading OLC, Barr writes, "Of all the positions I held in government, this was the one in which I was happiest." (55) He notes this in surprise, saying he had not expected that serving as the department's "top egghead" in an "ivory tower" environment focused on research, analysis, and writing would be his cup of tea. Barr is adept at analysis, except, apparently, when it comes to himself. He had, after all,

Remembering a plaque at DoJ that regularly caught his eye, Barr raises America's response to a little remembered historical episode at the dawn of World War II—the landing by submarine of eight German military intelligence saboteurs in New York and Florida—as a role model for action in times of trouble.

been preparing for an academically oriented career, pursued this early on at CIA, and had a track record of success; the combination of skills and responsibilities at OLC seemed almost tailor-made.

In 1991, having been bumped up the previous year to the number-two position at DoJ and serving as acting AG—Dick Thornburgh had departed to run for Pennsylvania senator—Barr was faced with a crisis the resolution of which he would claim as his proudest accomplishment in office. At the federal prison in Talladega, Alabama, dozens of Cubans who had arrived in the United States during the 1980 Mariel boatlift and were facing imminent deportation had rioted and taken control of the facility. Barr became intricately involved in the response planning and directed the deployment of an FBI hostage rescue team, which he described as its first actual rescue attempt since formation of the concept in the 1970s. Lives were saved, the mission was a success, and Bush would point to Barr's handling of the incident—"professional and without fanfare" (107)—in his decision to nominate him later that year as permanent attorney general.

Although Barr's recounting of his first tenure at DoJ is fairly brisk, his predilection for and hardline stance on national security issues come across clearly. Owing in part to Barr's time at CIA, AG Thornburgh asked him early on to carry much of

DoJ's water at the National Security Council (NSC) and specifically asked him to serve on the deputies committee chaired by Robert Gates, which helped formulate policy options for the president and NSC. Barr lauds this committee—"the most effective and competent group in government I have been associated with"—and states that "my work with [National Security Advisor Brent] Scowcroft, Gates, and the rest of President Bush's national security team played a big role in the President's decision to appoint me Attorney General in 1991." (54)

Remembering a plaque at DoJ that regularly caught his eye, Barr raises America's response to a little-remembered historical episode at the dawn of World War II—the landing by submarine of eight German saboteurs in New York and Florida—as a role model for action in times of trouble. After the men were quickly captured in summer 1942, President Roosevelt commissioned a military tribunal, which convened at DoJ headquarters, to dispense justice. All were found guilty within a month; the Supreme Court upheld the president's right to try enemies for violating the laws of war; and soon thereafter six of the men were put to death. As Barr noted, "That generation did not dither around when it came to defending the country." (109)

He showed a further preference for military-oriented responses in late 1991, roughly two years after

Intelligence issues come to the fore in several other incidents during Barr's first tenure at DoJ. For example, he defends CIA when it is caught up in a web of intrigue surrounding an alleged cover-up involving the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) and the supposed secret funneling of funds to Iraq, known as "Iraqgate."

the bombing of Pan Am 103, which killed 259 crew and passengers (among them 190 Americans) and 11 on the ground. When briefing the NSC on DoJ's findings after an extensive investigation, Barr made an impassioned case that a criminal proceeding should not be the endgame and that sanctions were not the way to force Libya to turn over two of its intelligence service (JSO) officers for trial. Instead, he said, "at a minimum we should reduce the JSO headquarters to smoking rubble," prompting the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to quip, "I thought I was Defense, and you are Justice." (113)

Defending CIA

Intelligence issues come to the fore in several other incidents during Barr's first tenure at DoJ. For example, he defended CIA when it was caught up in a web of intrigue surrounding an alleged cover-up involving the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) and the supposed secret funneling of funds to Iraq, known as "Iraqgate."^a He uses this episode to make clear his feelings on one of the most significant controversies that would surface decades later in the Trump era:

[The] media's abuses perpetrating the Big Lie of "Iraqgate"

were unequaled until the "Rus-siagate" lies used against President Trump. In March 1991, at the end of the Gulf War, the mainstream media, almost acting as one, collectively took up and propagandized the totally baseless allegation that, before the war, Bush had secretly and illegally engaged in a program to build up Saddam Hussein's armed forces. This was accompanied by the further lie that Bush covered up the program by having his Attorneys General, Thornburgh and me, "obstruct" the Justice Department's investigation of illegal loans made to Iraq by the Atlanta branch of ... BNL. (129–30)

Barr also expresses sympathy for CIA officials implicated in the Iran-Contra affair, recommending pardons for all, not just the most prominent figures such as former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger: "I was particularly concerned that it would not be fair to pardon only the political-level officials while leaving out the CIA officers. All three—Clair [George] and [Dewey] Clarridge in particular—were legends within the agency and had long and distinguished careers fighting the Cold War. I thought leaving them out after their courageous service would not go over

well at the agency." (140) Not all of Barr's actions would be seen as far-sighted, however. Seizing on a thaw in US-Soviet relations and wanting to buttress his longstanding domestic crime priorities, one of his first acts as AG was to transfer 300 FBI special agents focused on Soviet counterintelligence to anti-gang work.

In the book's shortest chapter, only 13 pages, Barr covers some two dozen years between his departure from government service in 1993 and Trump's installation in 2017, during much of which he served as general counsel for what would come to be known as the telecommunications giant Verizon. Describing how he was lured by a CEO looking for "someone who would be imaginative and aggressive in pursuing its interests," (144) his fight against regulators and his innovative approaches to problem-solving sounds reminiscent of former CIA Director Michael Hayden's sports-themed admonition about pushing things to their limits, as captured in his memoir *Playing to the Edge*.^b Images of Barr getting chalk on his metaphorical cleats seem to aptly capture his lifelong approach to dealing with tough issues, whether in business or government, unafraid to use the maximum maneuver room possible in pursuit of his goals.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks punctuated this experience and provided occasion for Barr to pick up on earlier themes. He counseled officials working for President George W. Bush about the dangers of looking at the event purely through a criminal justice lens rather than as a

a. For a brief discussion of the BNL episode, see L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004* (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), 243. Available at <https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/the-agency-and-the-hill/>

b. See Hayden Peake's review in *Studies in Intelligence* 60, no. 2 (June 2016).



President Donald Trump shakes hands with Attorney General William Barr in the White House Oval Office during Barr's swearing-in ceremony, February 14, 2019. (Official White House Photo by Tia Dufour)

national security issue and—consistent with his support of how the US government dealt with the German saboteurs in World War II—advocated the use of military tribunals instead of civilian courts. Barr notes how Vice President Cheney held the same view and that Bush issued orders along those lines, but he leaves out whether any causality existed between his advocacy and the administration's response.

The Trump Years

The bulk—more than 400 pages—of Barr's memoir is devoted to the "Trump Years," but this is one of its biggest weaknesses. Whereas his depiction of the period culminating in service as the nation's 77th AG was too short, his recitation of his return as the 85th AG is too long. At times, it feels painfully drawn out, as if Barr's editor is forcing him to lengthen and separate into distinct chapters a number of issues that

could have been covered more briefly. Barr might have taken too literally his 1970s predecessor Ed Levi's description of the job, which he fashioned into the book's title: "It's just one damn thing after another." The book's numerous tangents and seeming loss of focus will sorely test readers' patience at several points; not all will elect to continue the journey.

CIA Connections

What might not be well known about Barr's return to service in 2019 is the role played yet again by his intelligence connections:

My first official connection with the Trump administration was in the first part of 2017 at my old haunt the Central Intelligence Agency. Mike Pompeo, confirmed as CIA director at the beginning of the administration, asked my friend Bob Kimmitt to chair his external advisory board – a bipartisan group of

business leaders and former senior officials who meet regularly to advise the agency on a range of matters. On Bob's recommendation, Mike, whom I had not known, invited me to join the group, an unpaid advisory post. I enjoyed reconnecting with the agency and working with my colleagues on the board and with the CIA directors – initially Pompeo and, after he went to serve as secretary of state, Gina Haspel. I found Mike and Gina immensely talented, quality people, and I became friends with both of them. I heard later that Mike was among those encouraging the President to consider me as the replacement for AG Jeff Sessions. (199)

Days after the 2018 midterm elections and the announcement that Sessions was resigning, Barr found himself at a CIA external advisory board offsite at which many board colleagues were urging him to take the AG job if asked. While concerned about Trump's temperament and the flood of negative reports issuing from so many observers, he comes down on the side of guidance that several other experienced hands seemed to heed as well, notably Jim Mattis, who became Trump's secretary of defense, and John Kelly, who served as secretary of homeland security and chief of staff. Barr cites similar advice from former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates, the CIA director turned secretary of defense who agreed to stay on during the transition from President George W. Bush to President Barack Obama. Gates told him: "Look, *somebody* has got to do these jobs ... and what is best for the country is that we get

Barr provides some interesting vignettes, including when he raced to the White House to get the president to immediately order the military to secure several high-level ISIS terrorist prisoners wanted in the United States when their Kurdish captors' positions in Syria were in danger of being overrun.

good people who know what the hell they are doing.” (218)

A chapter devoted specifically to national security in the midst of the Trump section allows Barr to close the circle on a number of issues from an earlier time in his life. Returning to his original substantive focus and shifting to a forward-looking posture, he declares, “By far the greatest challenge facing the United States in the national security arena today is the rapid rise of Communist China as an aggressive adversary.” (403) He cites the country’s well-known industrial espionage and tries to put his own catchy spin on it: “China’s goal isn’t to *trade* with the United States. It is to *raid* the United States.” (406) Although not personally claiming credit, he is probably taking liberties with the narrative when he notes that “Prior to the Trump administration, the United States did not have a coordinated response to counter the threat posed by China’s systematic pillaging of our technology.” (409)

In any event, the pendulum was certainly swinging, and by late 2021, following Barr’s and Trump’s departures from office, a number of US government organizations had announced the launch of new bureaucratic entities to face this threat. The State Department created a “China House,” and CIA inaugurated a China Mission Center, with CIA Director William Burns’s comments sounding

quite familiar: “The most important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century, an increasingly adversarial Chinese government.”

Barr criticizes many aspects of America’s involvement in Afghanistan and speculates “whether there was an alternative ‘lower intensity’ approach building on the CIA’s original success—*using* the tribal system rather than trying to supersede it.” (425) He registers contempt for the manner in which President Biden undertook the 2021 withdrawal—“reckless and moronic” (426)—but puts part of the blame on Trump. Just as Trump entered into office highly suspicious and disdainful of the Intelligence Community, so these lingering feelings would influence his actions up until the end of his tenure in this arena: “I believe Trump’s distrust of the intelligence and military communities prevented him from considering alternatives to complete withdrawal.” (425)

Barr provides some interesting vignettes, including when he raced to the White House to get the president to immediately order the military to secure several high-level ISIS terrorist prisoners wanted in the United States when their Kurdish captors’ positions in Syria were in danger of being overrun. Barr’s depiction of the White House’s ham-handed effort to replace FBI leadership by springing people on him out of the blue in the

Roosevelt Room is both comical and deeply distressing; Barr simply walked out and refused to consider the matter.

Barr uses these later pages to return to favored themes from before, noting his preference for military tribunals for foreigners accused of war crimes or terrorism, and stating that “I strongly favored keeping Guantanamo open” and adding more detainees to its ranks. (423) National security also provides a bookend to Barr’s return to DoJ in a personal way. Just days before leaving the department in December 2020, he announced charges against a third Libyan conspirator in the Pan Am 103 case; he had announced charges against the first two individuals when he was AG in 1991.^a Barr would note that so much had changed between his first and second tours as AG, but this continuing thread helped bring closure and link these disparate periods.

A number of other intelligence nexuses crop up during Barr’s second tenure at DoJ. Some of these are minor, like contacting various countries’ intelligence service chiefs in support of a DoJ investigation or engaging with “Five Eyes” partners—Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand—about the intelligence challenges of the use of encrypted communications by terrorists and criminals. Some are almost unconscious, his background at CIA seeming to influence his approach and choice of words, even if unwittingly.

Witness his use of a classic term from the heyday of CIA’s collaboration with Lockheed to produce the U-2 and A-12 spy planes and

a. On December 12, 2022, Abu Agila Mohammad Mas’ud Kheir Al-Marimi appeared in the US District Court for the District of Columbia on federal charges.

CORONA satellite: “I set up a skunk works of key players from the department and other agencies to ... fight against the Mexican cartels.” And some are much more notable, including looking into the FBI’s handling of former National Security Advisor Mike Flynn’s contacts with Russia before Trump took office and the investigation by the DoJ inspector general (IG) into former FBI Director Jim Comey’s inclusion of classified information in memos about his interactions with Trump, which he shared with his lawyers after being fired.

Fallout from the actions of a different IG, the Intelligence Community IG, generated considerably more attention—and headache—for Barr and prompted the first of Trump’s two impeachments following its referral to DoJ. As the world soon learned, an NSC staffer reported concerns arising out of Trump’s telephone conversation on July 25, 2019, with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky, wherein the president was alleged to have illegally attempted to press Zelensky into an action that would help Trump’s 2020 election bid and hurt the efforts of his expected opponent, Sen. Joe Biden.

Barr’s assessment of this case as “foolish” but not criminal exemplified his professed approach to all matters at the department, one that was frequently misconstrued in the opposite manner. He was candid about this with Trump prior to being selected: “As Attorney General, I would view my central mission as eliminating this double standard and restoring the same standard for everybody, regardless of politics.” (214) This corresponded with a mantra he attributed to Bush 41: “The best

The investigation by Special Counsel Robert Mueller into whether candidate Trump and Russia had somehow cooperated in an effort to influence the 2016 election, as well as whether President Trump had tried to obstruct that investigation, of course looms large.

politics at the Department of Justice is *no* politics.” (106)

What many observers interpreted as politically motivated actions could also be seen as excruciating efforts on Barr’s part to be fair to all sides, to apply reason and common sense, and to not be vindictive or engage in tit-for-tat actions. That he generated as much animus on the part of Trump as he did with the president’s opponents speaks to what a difficult task he set for himself, walking that fine line.

The investigation by Special Counsel Robert Mueller into whether candidate Trump and Russia had somehow cooperated in an effort to influence the 2016 election, as well as whether President Trump had tried to obstruct that investigation, of course looms large. Barr expresses at length his exasperation with this issue and explains his controversial characterization of its findings in a detailed manner, providing helpful background to some of the legal arcana behind his actions.

More baffling is his decision to include gratuitous personal details. Barr and Mueller had known each other for decades, both having arrived at DoJ around the same time in the 1980s, where the latter would serve as head of the Criminal Division. Barr thought highly of Mueller, and the two had been close professionally and personally, even their wives having become friends. How odd and surprising it appears, then, when Barr relates the story of his first meeting as AG in 2019 with Mueller and his

team about their work: “I noticed both of his hands were trembling ... and his voice was tremulous. As he spoke, I grew concerned. I knew he wasn’t nervous, and I wondered if he might have an illness.” (239) He continues: “Wow ... Bob has lost a step” (242), and, describing a follow-on meeting, “Mueller seemed unsteady.” (253)

Sense of Humor

For all its seriousness, Barr has a lighter side that peeks through and helps humanize him. Who would have guessed that Barr served as social chairman of his fraternity, where he “was kept very busy arranging Friday-night mixers and postgame Saturday parties”? (30) Or that when queried as to who should play him in a movie version of the Talladega prison rescue, he originally suggested the portly, loud-mouthed comedy actor John Candy? He also embraces being called a “space cowboy,” a term his younger staff applied to him and several former colleagues from the first go-around who all returned to DoJ under Trump, in reference to the 2000 motion picture about old-timers called back into the service of their country. A particularly curious personal tidbit is in the musical realm. Barr took up the bagpipes while growing up in New York in the 1960s and then resumed the practice in the 1980s in Washington; he would play at special Justice occasions and toured the globe in international competitions with a Washington area band. When he

originally marketed himself to CIA, he flagged a special qualification: “Bagpiping—excellent.”

Nonetheless, the book meanders in places, and Barr’s otherwise strong writing is at times subsumed by the sheer force of his viewpoint. He includes extraneous details such as Trump constantly asking if he would like a Diet Coke. In addition, Barr appears to enjoy flaunting his erudition, including repeatedly using the Latin expression *ipse dixit* (“he

said it himself,” an unproven assertion) (147, 554) and references to the ancient Greek playwright Aeschulus’s *Eumenides* (340) and 11th century King Canute’s apocryphal command to halt the tides. (458)

In the end, *One Damn Thing After Another* is a flawed piece of work. To its credit, it is an interesting and at times thought-provoking read, sheds light on notable events, and showcases a keen intellect, able to discuss controversial topics in ways that

might prompt a reader to examine long-held beliefs. However, Barr’s approach—part memoir, part analytical exposition, part diatribe—is less than ideal. A shorter, more tightly constructed book in the traditional manner of a Washington chronicle would have worked better and more closely matched expectations. The excised portions could have been turned into a follow-on volume.



The reviewer: Mike R. is a member of CIA’s History Staff.

Review Essay: Perspectives on Japan's Intelligence and National Security Challenges

Jōhō to kokka--kensei shijō saichō no seiken o sasaeta interijensu no genten [Intelligence and the State: The Origin of Intelligence that Supported the Longest Administration in Constitutional History] Kitamura Shigeru (Choukoron-Shinsha, Ltd., 2021), 516 pages, tables, figures.

Keizai anzen hoshō igyō no taikoku, Chūgoku o chokushi seyo [Economic Security: Confront China, the Aberrant Superpower]

Kitamura Shigeru, with Oyabu Tsuyoshi (Choukoron-Shinsha, Ltd., 2022), 325 pages, tables, figures.

W. Lee Radcliffe

Japan has made improvements in national security legislation, policy, and structure since the early 2000s, but the country has a long way to go to meet today's intelligence and national security challenges. That's the overarching message in Kitamura Shigeru's two works drawing from his four decades of public service in Japan that culminated in the positions of director of cabinet intelligence (DCI) and the national security adviser to multiple prime ministers.

Among his many roles since starting in the National Police Agency (NPA) in 1980, Kitamura served as the director of the Foreign Affairs Division of the NPA's Security Bureau Foreign Affairs Intelligence Department; as secretary to Prime Minister Abe Shinzo during his first administration; DCI and head of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO); and finally, during his last two years before retirement in July 2021 as secretary general of the National Security Secretariat under Prime Ministers Abe and Yoshihide Suga.

Not one to rest on his laurels, Kitamura has published two books related to intelligence and national security. The first, *Jōhō to kokka* (Intelligence and the State), examines the technical and legal frameworks that led to national security legislation and creation of the national security secretariat in the 2010s, mixed with personal thoughts and experiences during his career. The second, *Keizai anzen hoshō* (Economic Security), examines an undergirding theme of the first book: Japan, and in particular Japan's private sector, needs to further strengthen attitudes and approaches toward Japan's economic security. In both, Kitamura expresses disappointment in the state of Japan's intelligence and economic security. "It can still be

said that our country's intelligence and national security structure is underdeveloped," he laments in the foreword to *Jōhō to kokka*. (4)

Jōhō to kokka (Intelligence and the State)

Rather than presenting information linearly or in a traditional memoir format, both books incorporate a loose amalgam of intelligence and national security topics and include multiple chapter-length interviews of Kitamura by editors on a variety of subjects. The interviews are the most engaging portions of the books.

From the first question in the initial interview chapter in *Jōhō to kokka*, Kitamura speaks positively of US-Japan relations. After the editors ask him about a well-worn 1980s sentiment expressed by the powerful Liberal Democratic Party politician Gotōda Masaharu that Japan overly relied on the United States for intelligence, Kitamura asserts forthrightly that because of the geopolitical significance of Japan's position in Asia "compared to Gotōda's time, Japan-US mutual complementarity has increased," as Japan "can get intelligence that the United States can't." (65)

Indeed, Kitamura's emphasis on a strong US-Japan relationship undergirds much of the interview, which includes short vignettes and impressions of events, particularly during his time in the Prime Minister's Office. Kitamura touches on engagements with Director of National Intelligence James Clapper during the Obama administration and with CIA Director Mike Pompeo and Asia-focused leadership during the early period of the Trump administration. (74, 80–81) According to Kitamura, Japan was able to provide useful intelligence

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on North Korea's missile launches in the 2010s because it had "developed various means to collect intelligence ... unilaterally," without going into details as to how or what intelligence was collected. (74–76)

Kitamura also describes forthrightly Tokyo's genuine surprise at President Trump's election in 2016, because Japan's "Ministry of Foreign Affairs was predicting Hillary Clinton's election win." (77) Immediately after the election, according to Kitamura, PMO officials scrambled to reorient their engagement strategy to focus on a charm offensive led by Prime Minister Abe. Kitamura highlights Japan's early successes, with Abe securing the first in-person head-of-state meeting with the president-elect, and with Abe being invited to attend a high-level US briefing on North Korea with US intelligence officials months later as "a relationship of trust" had quickly formed. (77–78) The deepened level of trust meant that Abe at times acted as a "briefer" to Trump on North Korea's nuclear and missile tests and the return of abducted Japanese nationals, Kitamura claims, because the new president initially "did not have that much interest in the Asia-Pacific region." (81)

Kitamura provides only limited details of events in this and subsequent chapters, however. He only alludes to "anxiety" Tokyo felt about the "unpredictability" of the Trump administration, which "declined" with the start of the Biden administration. (85) Despite serving in intimate capacities on the North Korea issue since at least 2004, when the NPA put him in charge of a technical team at working-level talks on the abduction issue in North Korea in November that year, Kitamura provides no details of his direct engagements. On his role in negotiating with North Koreans in Vietnam in July 2018, first reported by the *Washington Post*, Kitamura replies simply: "No comment." (81) The response is perhaps fitting, since Kitamura did not inform US counterparts about the meeting either, despite "Washington's near-constant updates to Tokyo on its dealing with North Korea," according to the 2018 *Washington Post* article.^a

In one of the few detailed vignettes in the section, Kitamura contrasts open-source reporting on Kim Il-sung's death in 1994—when Kitamura worked at the

Japanese Embassy in Paris—and Kim Jong-il's death in 2011. With the elder Kim's passing in 1994, France's daily *Le Monde*, citing an unnamed source, published a sensationalistic article declaring that the North Korean regime was about to collapse. Kitamura describes how the embassy asked to brief the "French authorities" on Japan's assessment, which was based on "verification from multiple sources" and was at odds with *Le Monde's* report. Kitamura never found *Le Monde's* source, whom he thought might have had ulterior motives. "When the world's influential media conveys impactful news based on information of unknown origin, and their views differ greatly from ours, we ... share accurate information with relevant authorities when necessary [following] thorough vetting," he asserts, alluding to the impact of sensationalistic reporting on policy and foreign relations. (68)

Kitamura contrasts the *Le Monde* episode with the use of methodologies of controlled media in assessing events in closed societies such as North Korea. Immediately before to Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011, in addition to other information arriving at CIRO, Kitamura used North Korean state media's uniquely somber morning announcements of a "special broadcast" to be aired later that day to ascertain that Kim had indeed died. "The background and tone of the TV broadcasts were clearly dark," he explains, adding that North Korean state media had used special terminology to announce a forthcoming broadcast only three times before. (69) In contrast with *Le Monde's* earlier coverage, the continuation of traditional state media coverage indicated a regular, if rare, transition of power, he implies.

Much of *Jōhō to kokka* focuses on long and detailed descriptions of legal frameworks since World War II in the development of the national police infrastructure and the intelligence community, with many lengthy legal citations. This is a result of Kitamura's background, which he readily admits, as a graduate of the prestigious Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo, (100) and a veteran of the contentious battles surrounding "State Secrecy Law" legislation to improve the protection of classified material and other national security legislation in the 2010s, coupled with scandals that plagued the Abe administration. Disputatious Japanese media personalities

a. John Hudson and Josh Dawsey, "'I remember Pearl Harbor': Inside Trump's hot-and-cold relationship with Japan's prime minister," *Washington Post*, August 28, 2018. Tokyo's designation of Kitamura as a go-between on a possible Japan-DPRK summit was reported immediately after the US-DPRK summit in Singapore in mid-June 2018; see *Japan Times*, "Government to Pursue Talks with North Korea," June 14, 2018, <http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0004509394>.

sometimes attacked him by name during this period. As such, the meaty chapters would be of particular interest to legal scholars.

Keizai anzen hoshō (Economic Security)

In *Keizai anzen hoshō (Economic Security)*, Kitamura focuses squarely on Japan's need for increased vigilance in its economic national security, which was one of several underlying themes in *Jōhō to kokka*. With its tighter focus on Japan's economy and China, the book resonated more with Japanese readers judging by its number-one best-selling rank among Japanese economy books on amazon.jp throughout summer 2022 and the better initial reviews it received compared to his first book.

Kitamura pulls no punches. He begins by lamenting Japan's long postwar reputation as a "spy's paradise" in detailing at length a series of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean counterintelligence (CI) cases he worked since the early 2000s, cases that were also described in later chapters of *Jōhō to kokka*. The threat is particularly pernicious now, he asserts, given adversaries' increased use of "hybrid warfare" targeting a country's transportation and energy infrastructure, the financial sector, and civil society with cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, citing both Russia's actions in Ukraine and growing Chinese capabilities as examples. (14)

In one of several Russia-related CI cases, Kitamura details the 2005 "Savelyev affair," in which Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) officer Vladimir Savelyev posed as a Russian trade official in targeting Japan's semiconductor sector. (26–28) Savelyev was caught paying an employee of Toshiba Discrete Semiconductor 1 million yen for corporate proprietary technology. As an illustration of Japan's "spy's paradise" reputation, Kitamura describes how he was "honestly taken aback" at how Savelyev and the employee met in the open and sometimes even "walked side-by-side to the train station." The SVR officer seemingly no longer felt the need to adhere to traditional operational tradecraft of using deaddrops and maintaining only indirect contact with assets. Kitamura explains that Savelyev started with open-source research on the company's products and then solicited "information that would not be alarming to the employee." He then gradually requested more sensitive information, paying for entertainment as he did so. The employee ultimately copied sensitive semiconductor and fabrication information onto a flash drive for Savelyev in

return for "cash passed in an envelope." Savelyev fled the country before he could be arrested.

After detailing another incident in which Russian military intelligence (GRU) targeted Japan's Nikon for dual-use guidance technology, Kitamura observes dryly: "Russian intelligence officers are expanding their espionage activities." (28–30)

Kitamura also describes the 2005 "Yamaha Incident," when several employees of Yamaha Motor Company were arrested and the company was fined for illegally exporting up to 11 of the company's RMAX unmanned helicopters to Chinese companies with links to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from 2001, and for providing training on the drones for additional payments of up to 50 million yen a year. Kitamura highlights that not only did the drones have clear dual-use applications, Chinese companies were able to use Japan's advanced technology to make knock-offs and market them throughout the region, undercutting Japanese market share. "If we allow spy operations to target our advanced technologies ... we'll be strangling ourselves in the long run," he declares, citing a statement by the US FBI director. (31–38)

After reviewing other CI espionage cases, Kitamura details at length Japan's technology sector and provides examples of their dual-use applications. He talks about the importance of artificial intelligence (AI), the "data economy", cyberthreats to Japan's infrastructure, the weaponization of space, developments in bioscience, particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic, and the future combination of technologies in novel ways that will impact national security. In one of many examples, he cites the threat of AI-enabled drones that "swarm" their targets autonomously. In response, he notes government funding from 2020 to incorporate AI into Japan's "JADGE" national air defense radar network. (59–60) He also describes the danger of access to unprotected data, detailing, for example, the discovery of Chinese and other subsidiaries of the popular LINE messaging app with full access to users' personal information stored in Japan from 2018 to 2021. (173–75)

Kitamura describes the government's nascent efforts to strengthen Japan's economic security during his final years of service by establishing a permanent section in the National Security Secretariat dedicated to economic security (175–77) and working with political leadership to strengthen economic policy and legislation. (178–81)

He calls for more to be done, however, to strengthen the clearance process and to keep adversaries from accessing dual-use technologies and experts while at the same time nurturing Japanese advanced technologies and protecting critical infrastructure and supply chains. And despite his overall positive attitude toward US-Japan relations, Kitamura criticizes the US “miscalculation” on China dating to 9/11, when the United States focused overwhelmingly on counterterrorism while leaving China policy to “panda-huggers” (237–41) seeking to use improved international trade to drive domestic reform. This despite China’s long strategic emphasis on intelligence, citing Sun Tzu (209–18) and the 100-year history of the Communist Party of China culminating in the PLA’s “Three Warfares” doctrine from 2003. (219–20)

In both works, Kitamura calls for the expansion of Japan’s intelligence agencies and raising the status of the CIRO to that of an agency, as well as further strengthening legislation to protect classified information. For example, he derisively likens CIRO to a “personal mom-and-pop shop” of the chief cabinet secretary and says staffing lacks “homeostasis” (*Jōhō to kokka*, 96–97; *Keizai anzen hoshō*, 185), an allusion to the continuing challenges of a stovepiped intelligence structure (*Jōhō to kokka*, 12–13) and the disparate personnel assigned to CIRO. Indeed, Kitamura details the long history of

various proposals for intelligence reforms in the second section of *Jōhō to kokka*. An upgraded and independent intelligence agency would house and further professionalize a dedicated intelligence cadre, he explains, and it would also provide additional separation from the potential personal whims of individual politicians. (*Keizai anzen hoshō*, 185)

But by now, it has become a rite of passage for retired Japanese intelligence leaders and national security experts to call for structural reforms and expansion of Japanese intelligence capabilities. Ōmori Yoshio, a CIRO director in the 1990s, in one of many examples advocated for stronger intelligence services in his similarly titled *Kokka to Jōhō* (2006) and as an expert member of a 2005 advisory panel on strengthening Japan’s intelligence capabilities. Apart from the formal creation of an indigenous reconnaissance-satellite capability—with technical roots dating to the 1980s—Tokyo has only tinkered with expanding and professionalizing its intelligence capabilities in the past two decades. While this time might be different, given Tokyo’s increase in defense budgets and cyber defense personnel, a frank conclusion currently is that Japan’s intelligence capabilities will be increasingly limited without structural and expert technical improvements and further legal reforms. Kitamura’s works are an additional push in that direction.



The reviewer: W. Lee Radcliffe is an Open Source Enterprise officer and member of the Senior Digital Service in the CIA’s Directorate of Digital Innovation. He has more than 20 years of experience covering Asia and Eurasia.

Intelligence in Public Media

Spying Through a Glass Darkly: The Ethics of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence

Cécile Fabre (Oxford University Press, 2022), 272 pages.

Reviewed by Joseph Gartin

French philosopher and lecturer at All Souls College (Oxford University) Cécile Fabre begins her superb treatment of the ethics of espionage and counterintelligence with a pair of biblical references. The first is her title, drawn from St. Paul (“For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.” (*I Cor.* 13:12) and a brief recapitulation of Moses sending members of the Twelve Tribes of Israel to “go and spy the land” of Canaan to decide whether it was ripe for the taking (*Num.* 13:17ff.) Within the next few opening paragraphs, she has touched on Kaspersky Lab, Bletchley Park, John le Carré, WikiLeaks, and more. If the introduction seems discordant, there is a method.

Spying and its necessary companion counterintelligence are millennia old. The Israelites’ reconnaissance mission (to which we will return) is but one ancient example, and espionage remains an essential element of statecraft and, increasingly, private industry. If the profession is old, the literature is comparatively young, born in the aftermath of the great wars of the last century and the long wars of this one. Today, nearly 70 years of *Studies in Intelligence* is but one shelf in a groaning library of books and journals on intelligence, which Fabre estimates runs into the dozens of thousands. Yet only a small fraction of that corpus focuses specifically on ethics. Fabre does not offer much of an explanation for this disparity, but she rightly observes it is surprising given the connection between intelligence and war, for which there is a sizable body of literature on ethical conduct from St. Augustine to the present day.

Spying Through a Glass Darkly seeks to fill in at least some of the vacuum. From the outset, Fabre approaches the subject practically: “This is a book of applied moral and political philosophy.” (8) She sets out to defend two important if contested claims:

First, espionage and counter-intelligence ... are morally justified as a means, but only as a means, to thwart violations of fundamental risks or risks thereof, in the context of foreign policy writ large,

subject to meeting the requirements of necessity, effectiveness, and proportionality. Second, more strongly, intelligence activities which are justified on those grounds and under those conditions are morally mandatory. (3)

Only a few dozen pages in, the intelligence practitioner might be tempted to declare victory and stop reading, given that Fabre’s defense would seem to align well with the views of many. Fabre has little patience for arguments that the government has no right to secrecy, noting that preventing both appropriation and disclosure is necessary for security and that secrecy is therefore an appeal to the government’s responsibility to provide that security. (39) Figures like Julian Assange of WikiLeaks infamy might argue for full disclosure by a government, but Fabre wryly observes that he would have simultaneously claimed for himself the right to withhold information about the security arrangements made for him while ensconced in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. (53) The reader should press on, however, because the ethical landscape becomes more fraught as Fabre explores a series of dilemmas threaded together over the next 250 pages that comprise the key elements of intelligence: “deception, treason, manipulation, exploitation, blackmail, eavesdropping, computer hacking, and mass surveillance.” (3)

Not every conclusion Fabre asserts will find agreement in the hallways of spy agencies, US or otherwise, but her treatment of the issues should provoke reflection. From the outset, the practitioner confronts the principle of universality: “We cannot claim a fundamental right that we deny to others. Thus, we owe a duty of protection not just to those with whom we stand in a special relationship, but to all human beings wherever they reside in the world. (106) Moreover, intelligence is contingent, a relationship between the keeper and seeker of information, not a fixed thing. (45)

Consider that the Canaanites’ land, settlements, armies, herds, and soon “were there for all to see.” (38)

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None of it was secret. And yet, if they knew the Israelites were considering whether to attack them, in a violation of their fundamental right to live unmolested, wouldn't they then have regarded such information as secret? Likewise, wouldn't they have had the right to thwart the Israelites' unjust intentions? For intelligence officers everywhere, universality of fundamental rights and contingency seem to collide with the us-versus-them nature of intelligence—collector versus target, our laws versus their laws, our secrets versus their secrets—and the state's claim of authority over what to make secret and for how long.

Fabre explores contractarian arguments (Kant, Locke, Hobbes, Rawls, et al.) for and against espionage but leans heavily on the “dirty-hands” justification: one can act wrongly in one dimension but may nevertheless act rightly *all things considered*. (19) The spy does not face a moral conflict between two incompatible options in that “he must do wrong in order to do right or in order that right should prevail.” (19) Yet this is not a license for unfettered action. Read another person's mail? Yes, you might answer quickly. Torture a child to extract information from her parent? Well, no. Quite apart from the visceral objection the latter evokes while the former does not, reading someone's mail can be justified all things considered as defensive harm, while torturing a child—who should not be subject to harm even if her parent conceals a secret—cannot so be justified.

Fabre's defense of political secrets (i.e., the secrets of political communities, like the state) and political espionage (stealing those secrets) is relatively straightforward, although seemingly obvious claims “often prove harder to justify than we might think.” (37) Secrecy protects individual goods (e.g., the right to bodily autonomy) and collective goods (e.g., the services of a political community), and in reverse a party may seek such information to protect individual or collective goods. Fabre warns, though, that the “more expansive one's conception of security—beyond the strictly military and toward the more plausible construal of security as encompassing a community's critical infrastructure—the greater the difficulty.” (44) On balance, she finds political communities “are sometimes morally justified, indeed are under a duty, to engage in intelligence activities against other political communities as a means to conduct a rights-respecting foreign policy.” (71)

She casts a more skeptical eye on economic espionage, notwithstanding her concession that a presumption in favor of capitalism as a political-economic system “tilts the balance in favour of intelligence property rights in general, and of the right to secrecy over proprietary information in particular.” (77) States have a right to engage in economic espionage, and they are under a duty to do so to protect fundamental rights, she asserts, yet neither of these permissions extends to a means for pursuing unjust foreign policy, nor do they justify harm to a third parties' fundamental rights. (85) Fabre offers a qualified defense of acquisitive and protective deception as sometimes justified and even necessary, in so far as it is a means to procure secret information about other foreign-policy actors (even allies) and to defend one's secrets from attempts to procure them. (112)

This justification for espionage and counterintelligence rests in no small measure on their being directed at foreign parties; in the case of treason, the betrayal is within. “Laws against treason are rooted in deep-seated moral revulsion about acts which, in the political realm, are paradigmatic examples of breaches of loyalty.” (114) Nonetheless, treason is a contested concept, because it “is not always clear what and who the alleged traitor is actually betraying: one person's traitor is more often than not another person's loyalist.” An asset recruited by an intelligence agency to commit treason to help the United States can make an argument that the act is permissible or even mandatory (say, to thwart his country's unjustified violation of the fundamental rights of Americans), but it is context sensitive. (125–35)

Recruitment and treason go hand in hand, and here Fabre carefully explores the elements of manipulation, exploitation, and coercion that enable spy agencies to recruit assets. She concludes (somewhat reluctantly, perhaps) that espionage and counterintelligence are dirty business, “yet, not necessarily to be condemned for it.” (173) In Fabre's view, cyberintelligence operations raise new issues of identification, attribution, and speed, but they are not so fundamentally different from human operations that they require a new set of ethical principles. (197)

In the final and least persuasive chapter, Fabre is skeptical about the kind of “mass surveillance” that has emerged in the past 20 years, initially to combat terrorism but now widely adapted for many purposes, including by states to monitor their own populations. Fabre argues that

relative to other forms of espionage, mass surveillance is more likely to fail on the grounds of privacy and fairness, given the mind-boggling amount of information that can be collected. Like others, she also points to the risks that algorithms used in such surveillance can reinforce existing discrimination: “The burden is likely to fall disproportionately on those who are already unfairly disadvantaged.” (221) Fabre does not adequately consider whether distinguishing—as many intelligence officers might—between bulk-data collection and mass surveillance would change her arguments, and she does not explore how the ethical dimensions of either might differ when applied to the distinct phases of data collection, analysis, production, and dissemination.

Nonetheless, *Spying Through a Glass Darkly* is an immensely important contribution to the intelligence literature: It contains no reflexive critiques but instead offers thoughtful interrogation of the ethics of intelligence that will enlighten and sometimes rankle. It certainly ought to find a place on bookshelves everywhere. After all, Fabre argues, the key to ethical decisionmaking in espionage and counterintelligence “lies in the proper vetting and ethical training of intelligence officers; in fostering constant awareness amongst citizens and officials of the dangers of a culture of excessive secrecy; and in the normatively directed institutional design of intelligence oversight.” (51–52)



The reviewer: Joseph Gartin is managing editor of *Studies*.

Accidental Czar: The Life and Lies of Vladimir Putin

Andrew S. Weiss and Brian “Box” Brown (MacMillan, 2022), 272 pages.

Reviewed by Ursula Wilder

Chinese President Xi recently made headlines by saying to Russian President Putin: “I have a similar personality to yours.”^a In this Xi was half right. These two leaders may in some ways be twins, but they are fraternal twins, not identical ones. They share a genius for accumulating power, navigating ever upward in byzantine political systems, defending their positions at each step as the stakes rise and the knives come out. Both men govern with seemingly guilt-free business-as-usual ruthlessness. Both have said that they were destined to achieve the peak of power in their countries, joining the ranks of emperors and czars. Beyond their domestic triumphs, they equally consider themselves fit to inhabit the pantheon of global powers, and as entitled to use the same methods internationally that secured their positions domestically if they can get away with it. In these ways they do appear to have similar personalities.

Yet despite such similarities in political philosophy and methods, Xi and Putin differ markedly in key personality characteristics. Xi is a physically tall and large man. Though his body has become rotund with age—hence the once ubiquitous caricatures of Xi as Winnie the Pooh until they were banned in China—in his youth Xi was unusually strong. A notably swift runner, at age 13 Xi outran a pack of young Red Guards roaming the streets of Beijing during the Cultural Revolution bent on catching him and his friends; one of his slower friends was not so lucky and endured a severe beating. As China’s president Xi is a watchful presence, seemingly impervious to stress, pleasure, and grief. Ultimately Xi is cold and expressionless.

Despite maintaining a similarly inscrutable public façade, Putin face is less granite like. He is hotter, his presence more intense, sometimes even charming. Famously athletic—though age has also caught up with him – from his youth Putin demonstrated raw physical courage in moments of violence or dangerous crisis. He loves animals and star athletes, with whom he apparently shares an easy kinship. Putin’s famously explosive temper

would likely strike the icy, impervious Xi as self-indulgent and impulsive. But a reputation for explosiveness can be useful and deployed as a tactical tool of politics just as much as a reputation for perpetual sub-zero emotional flatness.

Accidental Czar, co-written by Andrew S. Weiss with art by Brian “Box” Brown, is a pictorial book, an imaginative experiment in graphic biography for adults that is advertised as “a life” of Putin. It is in fact something beyond a biography, a compilation of several books about a range of topics. These include Putin’s personal history and Russian history ancient and modern; a survey of key events in the US-Russia relationship spanning the 20th and 21st centuries; a commentary on the global implications of current cultural political dynamics in the US and tangentially in other nations; and an autobiographical short of the author’s time and experiences in office as a second-level adviser on Russia during the Clinton administration.

Despite a somewhat fractured timeline that risks becoming confusing at times, many sections of Weiss and Brown’s experiment in biography are deeply immersive. Weiss’ expertise and passion for all things Russian shines through in the sections focused on that country’s history and Putin’s place in it. Similarly, Brown’s artwork excels at capturing the tone of places and dynamics of historical events. He is particularly talented at depicting action, of either of individual people or en masse. His use of monochromatic color—which shifts with each section—and of bold line and curves submerges readers into his visual storytelling. When the text-driven aspects of the book lagged, the visuals often revved things up. In many sections author and artist worked together seamlessly to create something utterly engrossing. This was particularly true for the sections on Russia, and of Putin acting in Russia or other European settings.

Accidental Czar rests on a theory of political leadership that firmly rejects the “great man” approach to

a. Lingling Wei and Marcus Walker, “Xi Jinping Doubles Down on His Putin Bet. ‘I Have a Similar Personality to Yours,’” *Wall Street Journal*, December 14, 2022.

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evaluating political leaders, favoring analysis of culture and context rather than individual characteristics or personality. Weiss served in the Clinton administration and personally witnessed some of Putin's outbursts, once while serving as a note-taker in a meeting with President Clinton. He writes that "Putin basically exploded" and compares Putin's "hotheadedness" to the "smooth as silk Clinton" (83); his assessment of Putin never goes much beyond thuggishness to explore other depths in the leader.

Artwork by Brian "Box" Brown echo this approach, drawn in a style that erases personal differences between leaders' appearances. The result is a wash of mostly white and male faces; Brown's technique for individual portraiture is so minimalist that it is difficult to identify the different leaders, except through historical or physical context. Many of the portraits are simply unrecognizable as the famous faces whom readers have seen in numerous photographs and media, with the exception of an elegant little cameo of Condoleezza Rice. Brown's style of portraiture reflects Weiss' political theory: in *Accidental Czar*, individuals—at least those at the top—are both indistinguishable from each other and ultimately interchangeable. It is context and events that count.

Regarding the book's take on Putin as a human being, Hannah Arendt's famous dictum "the banality of evil" seems apt. *Accidental Czar* periodically returns to the theme of Putin the youthful street thug, killing and being chased by feral rats and bullying the weak. It is on this theme that the authors mostly measure him. But knocking Putin down to size and denying him a more complex

personality impedes insight into how this particular young thug, one among many running on the mean post-war streets Leningrad, rose to highest office and stayed there, whereas most of the other youths in his gang remained anonymously mired in the muddy snow. Refusing to see Putin's complexity does not make it less real. *Accidental Czar's* approach simply sidesteps his dark genius as a political leader, leaving the reader with an unconvincing shadow of the man we all scrutinize with appalled fascination.

This review was written the day after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the United States on December 22, 2022. We might call Xi, Putin, and Zelensky great political leaders of our current moment in history, some good and great, others bad and great. But all three are flesh and blood humans as well as leaders, not Hollywood caricatures of themselves or of our imaginations. If we want to understand them, we need to see them completely. So, yes, Putin may indeed be a thug...but is this all there is to him?

Do not read this book to gain a full understanding of Putin, the man, and the life thus far. Read it as a panoramic survey of the last 20 years of US-Russia relations from an author who served in the US government during the Clinton years; read it for the beautiful, austere art (minimalist portraiture aside); read it to understand the environmental take on history and politics. If you long for more on Putin, read his autobiography,^a and together with this book, you will get the picture and will be equipped to decide for yourself who is good, bad, great, or banal.



The reviewer: Dr. Ursula Wilder, Ph.D., is a DDCIA Fellow at the Center for the Study of Intelligence. She has served at CIA for 26 years and is an award-winning contributor to *Studies*.

a. Vladimir Putin, *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President* (Public Affairs Reports, 2000).

Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicization

Ofer Fridman (Oxford University Press, 2022), 261 pages.

Reviewed by Christopher Bort

Words have meaning. To be understood and taken seriously, we need to apply the right words to the right concepts. Otherwise, we risk becoming spreaders of misinformation, little better than, say, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, who insists on referring to his full-scale aggression against Ukraine as a “special military operation” and insists everyone around him do the same. The field of Russia studies, and nearly everything related to Russia’s leader and his effort to settle scores with the United States and NATO in recent years, has been especially vulnerable to definitional squishiness. It doesn’t help when even self-proclaimed experts like this reviewer sometimes have trouble sorting out the distinction between, say, “misinformation” and “disinformation”—the latter being information generated with the intention to deceive.

The same ambiguity obtains with “war” and whether the things that Putin has been throwing at us over the past several years—from amplifying social divisions inside the United States by way of social media to invading Crimea with “little green men”—constitute a form of war. Are we at war with Russia? It depends on your definition of war. If so, is it a hybrid war, a gray-zone war? It depends. Critically, definitions differ between Russia and NATO, and even between NATO and the United States.

Ofer Fridman tries valiantly to sort this out in *Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicization*, which includes, in its 2022 edition—following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—a foreword and afterword to the 2018 edition. Fridman aims to carry out something of an insurgency of his own against “loose and lazy use of language” about so-called hybrid warfare, whereby the “strategic lexicon has been polluted by different terms that describe the same phenomenon.”

In the new foreword, Fridman contends that in light of often over-the-top rhetoric from both Russia and the West about a hybrid war between the two sides, which began with Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, it should surprise no one that now, following the events of February

2022, we are in a real war. Words, then, have meaning indeed.

As the book’s subtitle implies, the concept of hybrid (or gray-zone) warfare has become politicized as Russia on one side and NATO and the United States on the other have struggled to try to understand each other’s motivations and intentions, with each side imputing hybrid or gray-zone warfare techniques to the actions of the other. Perhaps unexpectedly for the casual observer, the latest and most relevant incarnation of hybrid warfare arose not in Russia, but in the United States, where military theorist Frank Hoffman adopted the term in the mid-2000s to describe “a new tactical-operational environment” using a mix of regular and irregular forces, means, and methods.

At least, the hybrid warfare that Hoffman was describing involved actual “hot” warfare, which is a distinction that Fridman insists on. War must include actual war. By the time the Russians embraced the analogous term, *gibridnaya voyna*, in their own language years later, however, it meant something very different. It largely described informational warfare, designed to amplify social, political, and ideological divisions in an adversary’s society with the aim of weakening one’s adversary from within. If that sounds familiar, it’s because those are the techniques and motivations we in the West ascribe to Russia and its army of influence actors and useful idiots who spread divisive messages through social media, try to affect the outcome of elections, and amplify Russia’s narratives in the West. But in Russia, *gibridnaya voyna* refers to something that the United States wages against its adversaries, above all Russia (there is a separate Russian military concept, “next-generation war,” which more closely approximates Hoffman’s description of hybrid warfare).

On the way to developing *gibridnaya voyna* as a concept, Fridman writes, a series of Russian and non-Russian thinkers and theorists had been developing variations of ideas of how states undermine their enemies from within and erode their will to fight. Some of these, like the postwar theorist Evgeny Messner with his concept

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of “subversion war” and contemporary “Eurasianist” ideologue Aleksandr Dugin with “net-centric warfare,” have influenced the way Russians think about information warfare.

For many Russians, not just far-right conspiracists like Dugin but also those in the mainstream, it is an article of faith that the collapse of the Soviet Union without a shot being fired was the direct result of US-led information warfare. The Western world’s supposedly complex, well planned, and flawlessly executed recipe for the defeat of the USSR is something that contemporary Russians want very much to master and use against us.

The bad news is that, like any people who lost the last big war and never accommodated themselves to that defeat, the Russians have had a long time to think about and learn (or mis-learn) the lessons. While the United States occupied itself with a new world order, setting post-Cold War norms, and fighting terrorism or containing China, Russia was mastering the methods of *gibridnaya voyna* and gaining a temporary tactical-operational advantage over the West. The good news is that the advantage should not be overstated—the assumption that using new information warfare techniques is a guarantee of victory is like past mistaken assumptions about any new technology guaranteeing victory. It’s only a matter of time before tactical-operational gaps are bridged by the other side, Fridman assures us.

Fridman’s prescription for countering Russian information warfare is straightforward. The West needs to cultivate its own advantages—its openness and freedoms, above all—while honing its defenses, and not try to respond attack for attack. Citing George Kennan, Fridman says the West should try harder to understand Russia and not give in to fear of Russian *gibridnaya voyna*, the way an earlier Cold War generation feared a “red under every bed.” On these points, Fridman is undoubtedly correct.

In appealing for a better understanding of Russia, though, Fridman strikes what are likely to be

controversial notes. In part, he wants the West to understand how its own actions, among which are its disregard for Russia’s security interests, have driven the Russian leadership to reach for innovative, asymmetric ways to even the playing field. Resentments about the West’s supposed neglect of Russia’s interests, Fridman says, are widely shared in Russian society and are not unique to an unaccountable elite at the top. Fridman also urges that Western discourse distance itself from the recommendations of Russia experts from Central Europe, on whom he says the West overrelies. Poles, Balts, and other Central Europeans by dint of history espouse an “alarmist agenda” about Russia. They don’t understand well how the “more experienced West” won the Cold War, and would prefer that the West respond to Russian hybrid warfare tit-for-tat. He also urges the West to refrain from trying to build democracy in Ukraine and accept a role for Russia in the region.

Here, Fridman is making a realist argument echoed by John Mearsheimer—whom he approvingly cites—among others. Advocating for recognizing Russia’s security interests is not wrong, of course, but Fridman is swimming against a tide he could not entirely have foreseen. After nearly a year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a broad view has developed within even some of those supposedly more experienced Western nations that the “alarmist” Central Europeans had the Russian threat exactly right, and that supporting Ukraine against Russia is the only proper response.

It’s a much more naked and destructive role than one suspects Fridman, and many other observers, anticipated. It’s grossly disproportionate to any “threat” that Ukraine or probably even NATO posed, or was likely to pose, to Russia. In one respect, though, the invasion validates Fridman’s point about hybrid warfare. The concept has been politicized to the point of being meaningless. Moreover, as a form of information warfare without actual firepower to back it up, it is largely ineffective. At some point, Putin must have come to the same conclusion.



The reviewer: Christopher Bort is a CIA senior analyst and the former National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia.

Intelligence in Public Media

Understanding the New Proxy Wars: Battlegrounds and Strategies Reshaping the Greater Middle East

Peter Bergen, Candace Rondeaux, Daniel Rothenberg, and David Sterman, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2022), 416 pages, index.

Reviewed by Alissa M.

During the Cold War, proxy wars were tools for great powers to confront each other without the risk of escalation into nuclear conflict. The nature and structure of these proxy conflicts—e.g., the Vietnam War and the US efforts to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan—were well understood in the international relations literature, but since the Arab Spring (2010–12) proxy wars have changed and the old bipolar model does not help scholars or policymakers understand these conflicts. With that in mind, Peter Bergen et al., have compiled a volume of essays exploring the new generation of proxy wars in the Middle East—primarily the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

The core thesis is summed up in the book’s closing pages: “Proxy wars are not just for great powers anymore.” (319) If there is a second thesis, it’s that proxy wars are best used to achieve destructive ends—toppling existing regimes, defeating terror groups—but patently unsuccessful at achieving constructive objectives like rebuilding civil society and governing. The contributors have a variety of backgrounds, including journalism, academia, and government. Edited by a trio of Arizona State University professors and journalist Peter Bergen, *Understanding the New Proxy Wars* was born out of a project to explore proxy conflict through fieldwork, oral histories, data collection, and other ground-level research methods.^a The strongest chapters cleave closely to that methodology. The examinations of conflict from the perspectives of a state actor or the leadership are less compelling.

The book is divided into three sections: first establishing the need for a new understanding of contemporary proxy conflicts, then examining the role of local dynamics on the success or failure of proxy use, and ending with analysis of proxy strategies at the nation-state level. In two chapters, Part I sets the groundwork for defining

contemporary proxy conflict through a legal lens and makes the case for the policy relevance of a new understanding of proxy conflict. It includes a useful literature review, a definition of proxy conflict focused on the absence of constitutional controls, and a justification of the utility of this definition for policymakers. It also establishes the historical context for the chapters that follow by defining three eras of proxy conflict: Cold War (Vietnam), post-9/11 (Iraq and Afghanistan), and post-Arab Spring (Libya, Syria, Yemen).

The second chapter of Part I draws lessons from the Syrian civil war for policymakers: they need a clear political strategy and defined goals; they must make an accurate assessment of the proxy’s abilities and limitations; and it is critical to develop a plan to mitigate the challenges inherent in using proxies, including information deficits, coordination of action, and (mis)alignment of objectives. This chapter is a highlight, with a clear thesis and a defined methodology strengthened by the collection of local data to inform the result, namely that the Islamic State failed to maintain control of Aleppo because it lacked administrative and persuasive capabilities to complement its strong coercive capacity.

The five chapters of part II are the heart of *Understanding the New Proxy Wars* and includes lessons from intensive fieldwork as the authors examine the way local dynamics and governance can support or undermine the goals of sponsors and their proxies. The key finding—explored through discussions of the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen—is that the proxies who can help a sponsor achieve battlefield successes are not necessarily the ones who will be most adept at holding and governing territory afterward. This is not a revelation, but the use of fieldwork and data to support the finding across three conflict zones does show the complexity of local political dynamics and the reasons that there are no easy or

a. Bergen is best known for his books and essays on terrorism and the Middle East. See Hayden Peake’s review of *The United States of Jihad: Investigating America’s Homegrown Terrorists* (*Studies in Intelligence* 61, no. 1, March 2017).

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universally applicable pathways from conquest to governance. Chapter 3, for example, explains the value of existing social and financial networks in producing effective proxies by comparing Qatar's use of Muslim Brotherhood networks (already tightly intertwined) with the US and Saudi proxies who had more need of sponsor dollars (and thus were tightly bound to their sponsors, and less to each other) but possessed less administrative capability.

Part III's three chapters provide more conventionally academic looks at the strategies driving contemporary proxy wars from the level of state actors—Russia through the Wagner Group, Iran through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF), and the Gulf monarchies through their respective militaries. Chapter 8—“Decoding the Wagner Group”—returns to the legal-constitutional framework laid out in the opening chapter. Candace Rondeaux explains an interesting paradox of Wagner and other Russian private military contractors, which are legally outside the Russian constitutional framework but in practice operate as though they are subject to it. Rondeaux deserves significant credit for her work here, which accurately presages Russia's use of its overt, covert, conventional, and asymmetric tools (including the Wagner Group) in its latest war against Ukraine, which had not yet begun at the time of this volume's writing.

Chapters 9 and 10 look at two very different cases of state-proxy dynamics, with the highly successful and strategic use of proxies by the IRGC-QF to implement a strategy of “forward defense” (270) and the less effective and more reactive development of proxies by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in response to what they perceived as feckless US policy toward the Middle East and North Africa during and after the Arab Spring. These chapters explain Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi's thinking at a national level, in contrast to the earlier chapters' focus on field research and local dynamics.

There is much to recommend this volume, but in many regards it does not live up to the promise of the first two chapters. Taken as a whole, it is a hodgepodge

of approaches and not the coherent narrative of modern proxy war that the opening chapters portended. The chapters that make the best use of field research and data—namely chapters 4 and 7—were the most valuable and contribute the most new information to thinking on proxy wars. In contrast, chapter 3—“Social Networks, Class, and the Syrian Proxy War”—relies heavily on an argument based on sociological data but the sourcing is mostly news reports with only a smattering of interviews, which cuts into its credibility.

Comparing these wars to conflicts outside the Middle East—or even to each other—would have made this volume enormously more useful. What, other than the sheer number, makes these proxy wars different from others? Similarly, it would be interesting to read a comparison of IRGC's highly structured proxy strategy in Iraq, where many Qods Force officers are on the ground in both military and diplomatic capacities, with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar's use of force in Libya, where their contributions came through either their air forces or their pocketbooks.

Understanding the New Proxy Wars is most valuable as a reference or as individual chapters for readers already interested in the specific conflicts they explore. It is less useful as a cohesive framework for understanding proxy wars in general or specific conflicts. Most of part II is so intensely detailed with a maze of individual and organizational names and relationships that it may be very difficult for even readers with considerable knowledge of the region to follow the narrative. A thorough index, however, makes it easy to identify chapters with relevance to one's particular issues or actors of interest.

This book's lasting contribution may be its reminder that breaking things is easier than fixing them. Rare is the proxy that can both take territory and govern it afterward, and policymakers and intelligence officers alike would do well to heed the lesson that few strategic goals will be met through proxy conflicts, despite the allure of the tactical gains they can offer.



The reviewer: Alissa M. is a CIA analyst specializing in Middle East governance.

Intelligence in Public Media

White Malice: The CIA and the Covert Recolonization of Africa

Susan Williams (PublicAffairs Hachette Book Group, 2021), 651 pages, maps, photographs, list of acronyms, list of archives, notes, selected bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Charles Long

More than 75 years since CIA's founding, intelligence officers and students continue to reflect on the agency's legacy and accomplishments, many of which still cannot be fully explored in the public domain. One such chapter is CIA's role in Africa during the Cold War. Dr. Susan Williams is an accomplished academic and researcher who explores this important period in *White Malice: The CIA and the Covert Recolonization of Africa*. Williams is the author of *Spies in the Congo* (2016), which was about Office of Strategic Services' efforts in World War II to control the Belgian Congo's uranium and keep it from reaching Nazi Germany. Based in part on OSS archives, it was favorably reviewed in these pages and is a favorite of CIA officers working Africa.^a

White Malice focuses primarily on the overthrow and eventual assassination of Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba by his Congolese rivals and secondarily on the overthrow of Ghana's first prime minister, Kwame Nkrumah, by the Ghanaian military. She draws on a wide range of sources, including declassified CIA and UN archives, US congressional investigations, interviews (conducted by others) of former CIA personnel, books of two former CIA officers involved in operations in Cold War Africa, and even *Soldier of Fortune* magazine.

Williams' superior research skills are evident as she lists a panoply of programs, organizations, and individuals that she concluded were part of a CIA effort to destabilize newly independent African countries. US government policy and actions in Africa back then were often a few steps behind those of Soviet and East Bloc rivals. Soviet programs to influence and manipulate the emerging African leaders and governments were quite formidable. Yet Williams' book is comparatively less generous

in depicting this adversarial landscape of the Soviets that CIA faced in Africa. Readers may consider reading the Africa-focused sections of Christopher Andrew and former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin's excellent book, *The World Was Going Our Way* to develop a balanced view of competing US and Soviet efforts in Africa.^b

Alleged CIA involvement in the death of Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba is an old story. Williams offers nothing new or compelling to prove that, despite the wide range of options explored by the US government, CIA had anything more than official relations with Congolese forces that overthrew Lumumba or that CIA had a hand in Lumumba's murder by Katangan rivals on January 17, 1961. To back up her contention that CIA was involved, she draws on the memoir of Larry Devlin, CIA chief of station in the Congo at the time.^c

Devlin had a front row seat to the events in the Congo. He is also Williams' main villain, and she often treats him as a hostile witness. She frequently relies on Devlin's accounts of the events to build her arguments, yet broadly dismisses the memoir by claiming that "the book is incomplete and unreliable," (224) that "many examples of claims made by Devlin in his memoir do not hold up to scrutiny" (327), and that "it would be a mistake to rely on (his) memoir for any kind of truth." (347) Williams demonizes Devlin as "a CIA official who was cold-bloodedly plotting the death of the democratically elected prime minister of the country." (330) As the Senate investigation of CIA activity in the Congo determined in its detailed report, "there (was) no evidentiary basis for concluding that the CIA conspired in this plan or was connected to the events in Katanga that resulted in Lumumba's death."^d The CIA did not act alone, as the White House and US

a. See David Foy, "Review: *Spies in the Congo: America's Atomic Mission in World War II*," *Studies in Intelligence* 60, no. 4 (December 2016). Also at <https://cia.gov/static/1ad4ff4038891a50db48493ed1ff1b2f/review-spies-in-congo.pdf>

b. Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (Basic Books, 2005), 423–70. The book was reviewed in Hayden Peake's "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf" in *Studies* 50, no. 4 (December 2006)

c. Larry Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960–67* (PublicAffairs, 2007).

d. "The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence," Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, report, no. 94-4655, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (United States Congress, 1975), 48.

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government contemplated options to remove or eliminate Lumumba, CIA supported and ultimately benefited from his overthrow by Mobutu.

A chapter in this book that grabs significant attention is Williams' shaky claim that CIA made use of famed musician Louis Armstrong's US Information Agency-sponsored visit to the Republic of the Congo in October 1960 as a means of concealing actual CIA operational meetings in Katanga and Kamina. Williams bases this on speculation and a circumstantial chain of events that she maintains "would have been an ideal opportunity for secret meetings." (328) Like several other alleged CIA and US government transgressions listed in her book, the charges are easy for her to make but harder to disprove more than 60 years later.

After an uplifting opening chapter set in Accra during Ghana's independence, Williams recounts Kwame Nkrumah's governance, Pan-African leadership, and relations with Lumumba. These passages are insightful and valuable for students of African independence movements. Ultimately, Nkrumah became increasingly authoritarian. As Williams notes, some policies like the Preventive Detention Act of 1958 disturbed some of his most loyal supporters. (186) While Nkrumah visited Beijing in February 1966, he was overthrown by Ghanaian military officers. Williams draws on the memoir of John Stockwell, former CIA officer turned critic, to place responsibility for the coup squarely on CIA. The charges are unconvincing and appear based on accusations remarkably similar to the propaganda once used by the KGB during the Cold War.

Williams underplays the significant release in a 2013 volume of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series of formerly classified information about CIA covert action programs and paramilitary and air support to the Congolese government to quell provincial rebellions; many rebellions were communist-aided.^a Some other key conclusions are circumstantial and highly speculative, such as "despite the barriers, it is reasonable to assume

that ... an agreement was made" (297–98) and "No evidence is available to suggest that the CIA was involved in the publication ... but it is a reasonable speculation." (314–15) Using a declassified 1961 CIA financial expense report and accompanying certification statement for travel expenses, Williams places CIA at a Congolese military camp in Thysville, where Lumumba had been held and alleges that "CIA was therefore involved in events in January 1961, a fact that Devlin frequently denied." (387–88).

Extrapolation and conjecture aside, *White Malice* offers useful background on Ghanaian and Congolese independence and pan-African movements. Williams provides a broad bibliography and a useful list of archives to enable further study into US policy and activity in post-colonial Africa. With the exception of the author's more sensational claims, some CIA officers and intelligence followers come away from this book impressed with the range of the activity and the resourcefulness of officers in an intelligence service that had been formed fewer than 20 years earlier and that operated in a continent not well known to Americans.

Williams has lived in Africa and knows of intelligence in an academic sense, but this does not give her clear insights into the realities and limitations of foreign intelligence activity in Africa nor factors such as ethnic-based sectarianism and other conditions that affect such activity. In blaming CIA for so many of the events, Williams often understates the responsibility of many African protagonists. Although newly independent, they had agency. Readers who admired *Spies in the Congo* may find several disappointing instances of bias and hasty judgments in *White Malice*. CIA officers and students of intelligence and of post-colonial Africa should nevertheless consider reading *White Malice*, not necessarily to get a balanced view of CIA activity in Africa during the Cold War, but to be aware of the many misconceptions and distortions of that activity recirculating in the public domain.



The reviewer: Charles Long is the pen name of a retired CIA operations officer who served in Africa.

a. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968* (Government Printing Office, 2013). CIA Historian David Robarge reviewed the document in 2014: "CIA's Covert Operations in the Congo, 1960?1968: Insights from Newly Declassified Documents" in *Studies in Intelligence* 58, no. 3 (September 2014). Available at <https://www.cia.gov/static/b0454a75708171d0f7e59d3e63ef7a8b/CIAAs-Covert-Ops-Congo.pdf>.

From Development to Democracy: The Transformation of Modern Asia

Dan Slater and Joseph Wong (Princeton University, 2022), 348 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Anthony T. Sutton

It is widely accepted that wealth and democracy go together, yet it is little agreed why. Slater and Wong offer one way to relate the two, framing democratization as sometimes a strategic choice by autocrats grown strong enough to hazard political competition. The book's main service is supplying this big idea, equipping a reader with one more conceptual lens through which to view a blurry question. The potted histories of economic progress and political arrangements in 12 East Asian polities will be a convenience for any officer who lacks experience with the region.

Slater and Wong revive and revise modernization theory, a generations-old idea that economic growth sets the stage for democratization by moderating lower-class radicalism, diluting the benefits of nepotism, facilitating civil society, and introducing cosmopolitan social structures.^a Founding thinkers focused on societal forces independent of the state, making generic a story best told of first-wave democracies that urbanized, industrialized, and liberalized gradually from the 1700s to the early 1900s. Intellectual successors, watching developmentalist states modernize their economies amid mature global markets, observed the state protecting the social and economic privileges of entrepreneurs and white-collar workers. A second-generation modernization theory therefore focused on societal forces dependent on the state.^b

Slater and Wong direct our attention instead to regime and elite interests throughout a country's course of development. A successful developmentalist regime will have built up legitimacy by delivering prosperity. Such a regime typically also enjoys political and governmental bureaucracies that are competent and extensive. Thus advantaged, a regime has the strength to democratize with some confidence that it can win elections and maintain stability. All it needs then is motivation, which comes

from growing public demands—for less corruption, less repression, better labor conditions, freer civil society—that the autocracy is poorly suited to meet.

A regime can choose to translate its autocratic power into democratic dominance while it is in what the authors call the “bittersweet spot,” strong enough to choose democracy and scared enough to want to. This analysis expects a developmentalist autocracy's power to peak because the very success of economic development creates new challenges of societal expectations, per modernization theory, as well as new challenges of economic growth, per the theory of the middle-income trap, which is little explored here.^c Choices can go either way, of course, allowing the theory to comfortably explain examples and excuse exceptions as the book turns to clustered case studies.

Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea best illustrate democratization through strength. In each case, civilian conservatives were better organized than prospective political opponents and better reputed because they claimed credit for earlier economic growth. Electoral designs favored these conservatives: avoiding proportional representation in Japan that would have seated some communists; drawing multimember districts in Taiwan to reward internal coordination; and overweighting districts in South Korea in which the incumbent party had the most supporters. Geopolitical conditions also nudged ruling parties toward democracy because too much repression would risk access to US consumer markets and security protections.

Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma had military autocracies especially concerned with stability in the context of regional or communist insurgencies. After victories eased these fears, they experimented with reversible steps

a. The canonical introduction to modernization theory is: Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” *The American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (March 1959).

b. See, for example, Eva Bellin, “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries,” *World Politics* 52, no. 2 (January 2000).

c. See instead Richard F. Doner and Ben Ross Schneider, “The Middle-Income Trap: More Politics than Economics,” *World Politics* 68, no. 4 (October 2016).

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toward democracy, ensuring access to power through constitutional arrangements and elite networks. Indonesia had the best-developed party, and democracy stuck. Thailand's military lacked a similarly developed civilian partner because the monarchy remained the locus of conservative civilian politics. Burma had still less party strength or developmental success. Thai and Burmese militaries ended democratic experiments that threatened their control.

Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore inherited strong colonial legal systems and oversaw economic growth, but modernization via connection to global finance and commodity markets produced less of the societal pressure that might have motivated their regimes to hazard democratization. Controlled elections should have built confidence that the ruling party could win a fair vote, but Malaysia's regime feared ethnic unrest and factional divisions, Hong Kong's choice was dictated by mainland China, and Singapore's autocrats never felt the need. These regimes passed their peaks of strength and probably could not democratize as smoothly now as if they had tried earlier.

China, Vietnam, and Cambodia are only now reaching levels of development that could give their regimes the confidence to democratize. These case studies are forward-looking, asking whether regimes will attempt democracy through strength rather than explaining past decisions. The regimes might fear electoral defeat and fundamental instability if they democratize, in part because their socialist histories complicate the translation of unequal economic growth into ruling-party legitimacy. They will also struggle to gauge public discontent,

lacking the electoral signals available in autocracies that host unfree elections.

Slater and Wong write as regionalists building up to a theory rather than logicians imposing one on national histories. They appreciate the nuances that make cases more and less suitable to their argument. Consequently, a reader will gain more if they are already familiar with several literatures that appear only as passing allusions. Slater and Wong explicitly introduce modernization theory, but they provide less background on state-led developmentalist strategies,^a the debate about sequencing state capacity and democracy,^b game-theoretic models of democratization as a solution to lower-class demands for redistribution,^c the dynamics of leadership succession in autocracies,^d and the importance of geopolitical context.^e The book pairs well with Ziblatt's explanation that conservative-party strength determined the landed elite's sufferance of democracy in the early 1900s,^f yet Slater and Wong give their fellow traveler only a cursory citation.

As a reading experience, the book might exasperate a quick study when it repeats points in nested introductions to the book, each cluster, and each case. An officer more interested in efficiently extracting ideas than in languidly contemplating those concept would do well to seek the summaries and skim the details.

Still, this book introduces an analytically powerful idea and serves up case studies to help explore it. It reminds us that political actors can choose democracy as a self-interested strategy rather than a committed ideal. When our standard imagining is democratization forced upon a collapsing regime, it is valuable to picture how an autocracy can pursue democracy through strength.



The reviewer: Anthony T. Sutton is a governance analyst at the CIA.

a. See Stephan Haggard, *Developmental States* (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

b. See Haakon Gjerlow, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, and Matthew Charles Wilson, *One Road to Riches? How state building and democratization affect economic development* (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

c. See Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

d. See Ludger Helms, "Leadership Succession in Politics: The Democracy/Autocracy Divide Revisited," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 22, no. 2 (May 2020).

e. See Seva Gunitzky, "Democratic Waves in Historical Perspective," *Perspectives on Politics* 16, no 3 (September 2018).

f. Daniel Ziblatt, *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Intelligence in Public Media

Need to Know: World War II and the Rise of American Intelligence

Nicholas Reynolds (Mariner Books, 2022), 488 pages, photos.

Reviewed by J.R. Seeger

In summer 1940, war raged from the Low Countries to North Africa to China. As its allies fell, the British Empire mobilized, seemingly alone, while the United States remained uncommitted and isolationist sentiments ran deep. Hoping to shift attitudes, in June and July 1940 President Roosevelt sent Wall Street lawyer William Donovan on two fact-finding trips to the United Kingdom. Donovan was to observe and report back on the chances the UK would survive the Nazi onslaught. Equally important was Donovan's role in selling the importance of the Lend-Lease Program at home, which provided the Royal Navy with retired US Navy ships that could help in convoy duty. By sending an Irish American war hero and well-known Republican, Roosevelt hoped Donovan's assessments would not be considered simply White House propaganda.

Donovan's trip was also played into a much larger effort by London to counter German propaganda in the United States and bring it into the war on London's side. With the assistance of William Stephenson, the senior MI6 officer in the United States, Donovan was given full exposure to the entire complement of British clandestine efforts against the Nazis. He toured commando training and multiple UK military bases, including in Gibraltar and Egypt, and was briefed by the heads of MI6 and the Special Operations Executive. When Donovan returned to the United States, Stephenson and UK leaders used every possible means to make sure that Roosevelt integrated Donovan into the US intelligence establishment.

But what was that establishment? This is where Nicholas Reynolds, for a time the CIA Museum's contract historian and author of *Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway's Secret Adventures, 1935–1961*, begins *Need to Know*. In 1941, a better description of the US intelligence establishment would have been intelligence fiefdoms. The State Department received reporting from its missions abroad. The War and Navy Departments had attachés with the responsibility of reporting on

military intelligence. Small cryptographic units in both departments worked on foreign government ciphers. The attorney general and FBI director received reporting from their corresponding field offices—the senior US attorneys in the various states and the FBI divisions. Treasury received information from the Secret Service and Customs. However, none of those offices was obliged to provide raw intelligence or analysis to the White House.^a And each jealously held their “intelligence” and prevented the other parts of the government from even knowing what types of collection they were undertaking.

Inside the army and navy, there was very little interest in anything but conventional warfare. The Marines had long experience in “small wars” and even produced a manual on the subject in 1940. However, the manual focused far more on what we call counterinsurgency rather than unconventional warfare. As war in Europe and Asia loomed, the services focused on what they could do best in a great power conflict and that did not include unconventional warfare.

Reynolds begins by explaining to the reader why his book belongs on already-crowded shelves detailing US intelligence operations in the 1940s. Reynolds asks: “But hasn't the story been told? What could be missing from the American intelligence bookshelf?” (xix) War's end generated dozens of memoirs and declassified tales of operations by members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the FBI. A quick search of books published in the first two decades of this century reveals well over 50, again a mix of memoirs and histories based on recently archived documents. Anyone interested in the history of US intelligence in World War II has plenty of volumes to choose from. That said, Reynolds's book is a must for any serious student of the role of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination in the war years.

Why is this? While most books focus on a single service or a single aspect of US intelligence operations

a. President Roosevelt was given to nurturing his own intelligence sources. See Steven Usdin, “Stranger than Fiction: John Franklin Carter's Career as FDR's Private Intelligence Operative,” *Studies in Intelligence* 65, no. 2 (June 2021).

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

during the war years, very few balance the multiple aspects of the history that must include consumers, managers, collectors, and analysts. Reynolds offers a trove of detail on the interplay among the various consumers of intelligence, including the White House, cabinet members, commanders in Washington and the theaters, J. Edgar Hoover, and Donovan. He balances this history of political intrigue in Washington with exceptional details of the daily challenges faced by army and navy cryptanalysts, headquarters and field officers of OSS, and the FBI Special Intelligence Service officers based in key cities throughout Latin America.

While there are some adventure tales embedded in this story, Reynolds focuses his attention on the interaction among the major players in Washington and between those players and the seniors in the field. In chapter after chapter, Donovan stands out as probably the most important figure in creating the modern intelligence community. In 1941, after his travels, Donovan imagined a unified service that would include intelligence collection and analysis, special operations, and “morale operations” (his term for secret propaganda). Many authors, including multiple Donovan biographers, have detailed this. Where Reynolds’s book is critically important is his effort to show Donovan’s full persona: visionary but failed administrator; crafty politician but willing to make and nurture enemies in Washington; strategic thinker but a man who focused almost his entire day-to-day attention on tactical issues that should never have been on his agenda. In sum, Reynolds provides an honest assessment of the man. (332)

Many books on strategic intelligence in World War II focus on either the brilliance of UK and US cryptographers or on the derring-do of special operations efforts, but Reynolds provides an excellent blend of both. He provides a clear and concise history of the importance of both army and navy cryptographers in winning the war in the Pacific as well as revealing some of the lesser known OSS operations in Europe, such as the Sussex teams, which focused on tactical intelligence collection behind German lines just ahead of the Allied advances, or the espionage

work of Allen Dulles to collect strategic intelligence on the Nazi war machine.

If there is a shortcoming, it is the minimal attention paid to OSS operations in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater and the entirely independent intelligence-collection effort managed by General MacArthur’s staff in the Pacific. OSS in the CBI included substantial intelligence analysis for the theater commanders, morale operations against the Japanese army, secret intelligence collection, paramilitary operations, and operations designed at the end of the war to find and free Allied POWs. Other than a brief discussion of the creation and deployment of OSS Detachment 101 in early 1942, the CBI operations are not described with the same focus and detail as the European operations. In the Pacific, probably because of a personality conflict with Donovan dating back to WW I, MacArthur refused to allow OSS in his area of operations. That did not mean he ignored intelligence collection or special operations. Rather, he created his own intelligence network to support the island-hopping campaign synchronized with the US Navy operations.

This is a small point in what is a critically important book for both scholars and intelligence professionals. Few historians have taken on the task of understanding the full complement of US intelligence operations in the war. Reynolds takes the reader through the war years and describes in detail the challenges faced as the community worked to build a cohesive intelligence picture of the world that was changing through the course of the war. Detailed endnotes and an extensive bibliography provide multiple routes to explore after reading his book.

The personalities, the challenges, and the changes in the intelligence bureaucracy described in *Need To Know* shaped the postwar years of US diplomacy and intelligence. Reynolds’s conclusion captures this final point: “This was the legacy of World War II. America began the war with little useful intelligence of any kind but was able to rely on improvisers.... By the end of the war, America had many more intelligence resources ... but important issues that had cropped up during the war remained unresolved.” (340)



The reviewer: J.R. Seeger is a retired CIA operations officer and regular contributor to *Studies*.

Intelligence in Public Media

Capturing Eichmann: The Memoir of a Mossad Spymaster

Rafi Eitan and Anshel Pfeffer, trans. Galina Vromen (Greenhill Books, 2022), 352 pages, photographs.

Reviewed by Ian B. Ericson

The history of Israel contains its share of covert triumphs as well as the occasional embarrassment, no doubt owing to Israel's willingness to entertain unconventional operational gambits as a survival mechanism. Rafi Eitan found himself at the center of a number of these gambits, and shortly before his death in 2019 he authored a memoir in which he describes them with an uneven—and in the instance of his handling of the American spy Jonathan Pollard criminally unsatisfying—level of detail. A much-shortened English translation of the original Hebrew edition was released by Greenhill Books in 2022 with an introduction by Ha'aretz journalist Anshel Pfeffer.

Rafi Eitan's place in the pantheon of Israeli spy legends is secure, and it is a boon to the literature on Israeli spycraft that he was able to complete his memoir shortly before his death in March 2019 at age 92. Despite the book's title, the account of Eichmann's capture accounts for only 50 out of 330 pages. Eitan's biography is that of an unapologetic, committed Zionist whose life was spent in service of the security and prosperity of pre- and post-independence Israel.

Eitan was born on Kibbutz Ein Harod in 1926 in the British Mandate of Palestine, both his parents having emigrated from Soviet Belarus shortly before. The British, Arabs, and other real or potential opponents of Jewish nationhood barely register in Eitan's memory except as amorphous foils to be dealt with methodically and, at times, remorselessly. One particularly harrowing example is Eitan's chronicle of his execution, as part of a terrorist campaign to discourage German immigration, of two unarmed German settlers who were seeking a return to their settlements near Haifa in 1946. It is disconcerting to read Eitan describe his point-blank summary execution of two men with no known ties to Nazism in front of their screaming wives. It would be inaccurate to argue that Eitan had no moral compass, but there is little doubt his scruples were subservient to the realization of an independent and secure Israel.

Eitan's experience in the Palmach, the Zionist military's special forces entity in the Mandate period, made him a natural fit to help stand up the Israeli intelligence services following independence in 1948. The fact that Eitan's second cousin was Isser Harel, the godfather of Israeli intelligence and the first head of both Israel's internal (Shin Bet) and external (Mossad) services, also played a role in his hiring. Eitan regarded his early intelligence work on behalf of Israel as hardly distinguishable from his work on behalf of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's Mapai Party, for which Eitan even went so far as to offer to stuff ballot boxes (the offer was refused). His enthusiasm in this regard is reminiscent of G. Gordon Liddy's for Richard Nixon.

Throughout his career in Israeli intelligence, Eitan exemplifies the tactical flexibility that best explains why Israel consistently triumphed over its Arab adversaries. Israelis are simply much more adept at adapting to the inevitable fog of war.

All of his work in the 1950s is a prelude to his master act: the capture of Eichmann in Argentina in 1960. This tale has been told many times, perhaps most famously by Harel himself in *The House on Garibaldi Street* (1975), though Eitan's perspective is particularly valuable given his role as operations chief on the ground. Harel held court in a Buenos Aires café for the duration of the operation, playing little substantive role in its success but probably keeping an eye on posterity. Eitan evinces a regular frustration with Harel's micromanagement, glory-seeking, and tendency to deploy 20 officers to the field when 10 would do. The criticism of Harel is not gratuitous, however, and Eitan maintains a clear respect for Harel's contributions to Israel's security.

Eitan's riveting account of the Eichmann operation does not disappoint, not least because there was nothing at all inevitable about its success. As a wise officer once noted, the great thing about operations is that so much can go *wrong*. Eitan's description of the team's navigation of

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the many challenges of bringing one of history's greatest criminals to justice is worth the price of the book.

Eitan's other notorious accomplishment, handling US Navy analyst-turned-spy Jonathan Pollard, merits barely four pages of text, and provides no specifics on the operation or Pollard himself.^a Eitan justifies the effort by pointing out that Israel had been betrayed by its friends in the past and had an obligation to act solely according to its interests, omitting from his calculation the consequences to Israel's interests in the event it got caught. The chapter concludes with a postscript in which, somewhat melodramatically, Eitan's editor claims that Eitan from his deathbed ordered all of his previous texts on the affair destroyed. A more cynical interpretation is that Israel's censors decided there was little benefit from rehashing the unpleasant dustup with Israel's patron.

Eitan had personal relationships with many if not most of the giants of Israeli history, from Ben-Gurion to Harel to Sharon, making his perspectives on these figures

a useful contribution to the literature. One of the downsides of waiting nine decades to write a memoir, however, is that many of the memories are necessarily dated and therefore less reliable. And Eitan relies on memory rather than contemporaneous notes, requiring skepticism on some of the details.

Eitan covers considerable other ground, ranging from defending his record in Lebanon in the 1980s to a description of his personal ties to Fidel Castro, which will be of less interest to an American audience. These chapters remain of value, however, as is Eitan's political analysis of the intractable conflict with the Palestinians. Eitan was a close ally of Ariel Sharon and generally supported a more rightwing Likud security platform. Nonetheless, as the book closes, Eitan asserts that "the oppression of millions of Palestinians cannot be justified by security needs" and advocates exiting most of the West Bank unilaterally. Such a platform would have him on the outside looking in of any plausible Israeli government today.



The reviewer: Ian B. Ericson is the pen name of a CIA officer.

a. Pollard was arrested in 1985 and convicted in 1987 of spying for Israel. Released from federal prison in 2015, he later emigrated to Israel.

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf—March 2023

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake and others.

Intelligence and Policy: Covert Action

The Third Option: Covert Action and American Foreign Policy, by Loch K. Johnson

History

Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949, by Thomas Boghardt

Prisoners of the Castle: An Epic Story of Survival and Escape from Colditz, the Nazis' Fortress Prison, by Ben Macintyre

Sidney Reilly: Master Spy, by Benny Morris, and ***The Greatest Spy: The True Story of the Secret Agent Who Inspired James Bond 007***, by John Harte

The Venlo Sting: MI6's Deadly Fiasco, by Norman Ridley

The Island of Extraordinary Captives: A Painter, a Poet, an Heiress, and a Spy in a World War II British Internment Camp, by Simon Parkin (Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson.)

Intelligence Abroad

Canadian Military Intelligence: Operations and Evolution from the October Crisis to the War in Afghanistan, by David A. Charters

The Handbook of Asian Intelligence Cultures, by Ryan Shaffer (ed.)

Memoir

Spy Daughter, Queer Girl: A Memoir In Search of Truth and Acceptance in a Family of Secrets, by Leslie Absher

The Yank: A True Story of a Former US Marine in the Irish Republican Army, by John Crawley (Reviewed by Joseph Gartin.)

Fiction

The Able Archers: Based On Real Events, by Brian J. Morra (Reviewed by Graham Alexander.)

The Bucharest Dossier: A Novel, by William Maz (Reviewed by Graham Alexander.)

The Wayward Spy—A Novel, by Susan Ouellette (Reviewed by Mike R.)

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Intelligence and Policy: Covert Action

The Third Option: Covert Action and American Foreign Policy, by Loch K. Johnson (Oxford University Press, 2022), 388 pages, endnotes, bibliography, appendices, index.

In his 1981 book, *The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations*, former CIA operations officer Ted Shackley took a narrow view of the diplomatic alternative commonly called covert action. Concentrating on counterinsurgency driven by executive policy, he gave scant attention to the paramilitary or propaganda forms of covert action.

After noting that “no one is currently able to write a definitive analysis of America’s covert actions because so many of the detailed operational records remain classified,” (xv) retired University of Georgia professor Loch Johnson nonetheless presents a wide-ranging treatment of covert action in his version of *The Third Option*. His account views covert action as a promising and, in theory, quicker though often problematic alternative for dealing with diplomatic problems overseas. (6)

Johnson draws on more than his academic credentials for this book. He served as a senior staffer on congressional oversight committees in the mid-1970s and the Aspin-Brown Intelligence Commission on the Roles and Missions of Intelligence. Throughout his career Johnson has written books and articles on various aspects of intelligence, several of which earned him awards from professional societies and one from this journal.^a He was also senior editor of the journal *Intelligence and National Security* for 17 years and a member of the advisory board of the *Journal of Intelligence History*.

Because Johnson has no direct experience conducting covert action operations, *The Third Option* is not in any sense a “how to” book. It is in every sense an account of how covert action appears to the non-practitioner because Johnson has interpreted the accounts of former participants and journalists relying on secondary sources. Thus, readers are advised to exercise caution because some are notoriously unreliable, like works by Victor Marchetti, Miles Copeland, and Tim Weiner (see bibliography) and do not in many cases convey an objective view of events.

Johnson considers the third option as one of the “three major instruments that guide this nation’s activities abroad: the Treaty Power, the War Power, the Spy Power.” And he uses covert action and spy power synonymously. Perhaps a more accurate expression would be “intelligence power” since the word ‘spy’ has a great deal of fictional baggage. (xi)

The Third Option divides covert actions directed against nations, groups, and individuals into four categories: propaganda, political, economic, and paramilitary operations. (19) And then, because all covert actions are not equal in intent, risk, resources, or outcome, he presents a detailed “ladder of clandestine escalation” with rungs that ascend from modest, low-risk attempts at media manipulations “to the widespread killing of civilians at the top.” Examples of the latter include the covert actions in Cuba after the Bay of Pigs disaster, which led to repression of civilians, or in the aftermath of the 1973 overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende by Gen. Augusto Pinochet, whose dictatorship brutalized thousands. In climbing the ladder, Johnson describes the trade-offs a nation faces when considering “increasingly serious intrusions into the sovereignty of other nations accompanied by breaches of international law and other widely recognized moral ‘bright lines.’” (42)

The Third Option narrative presents a series of capsule histories or case studies of covert actions that address the substantive issues with which Johnson is concerned. In question form they include: how and where the various covert actions techniques have been employed “and toward what purposes?” Have they achieved their objectives? What are the legal foundations and bureaucratic paths to be followed in the United States binding the third option? How is accountability achieved and how well are these operations supervised by the White House and the Congress? And what methods should be considered unacceptable for the United States? It is here in particular that Johnson is careful to integrate the views of the “practitioners of the Third Option themselves.” (252)

a. Loch K. Johnson, “The Aspin-Brown Intelligence Inquiry: Behind the Closed Doors of a Blue Ribbon Commission,” *Studies In Intelligence* 48, No. 3 (2004), 1–20. Among Johnson’s recent books are *National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies*, Second Edition, (Polity, 2017) and *Spy Watching: Intelligence Accountability in the United States* (Oxford, 2018)

The discussion and analysis of specific covert actions is confined to two periods: 1947–75 and 1975–2020. In the first period, authority for covert actions is found in the National Security Act of 1947, with its recognition that the CIA must sometimes engage in “functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.” (13–14). Examples include low-risk propaganda activities, morally questionable assassination plots, and high-risk paramilitary operations.

The second period is a consequence of the Hughes-Ryan Act of December 30, 1974, largely enacted in reaction to the events in Chile. This law increased congressional oversight and placed more specific accountability requirements on the executive branch. The result complicated planning and reporting on covert actions for the CIA but has been generally accepted as a prudent change. (117)

The final part of *The Third Option* presents an overall assessment of the book's arguments by considering whether the covert action should remain an instrument of US foreign policy, and if so, what safeguards should ensure its proper conduct. Johnson's judgment is that far too many covert actions “have proven feckless or, more alarming still, harmful to the global standing of the United States—and truly devastating to target nations.” (272) Some have been “morally mottled” because ethical considerations seem to have been disregarded. Johnson stresses that a moral component should distinguish the covert actions performed by Western democracies from those undertaken by autocratic regimes, like Russia and China. (223–4)

Toward that end, Johnson offers a “fourth option” for conducting United States foreign policy: “the virtue of leading by example... doing the right thing that others,

at home and abroad, will respect and admire, acting with a dignity and patience that befits the world's oldest and strongest democracy.” (275) An alternative, not stated, is that this option is inherent under the current rules for properly conducted covert actions.

The Third Option is the most thorough, thoughtful, provocative, and extensively documented contribution to the literature of covert action as an element of the intelligence profession. But even Johnson has not eluded the maxim that “errors are an enemy no author has defeated.”

The CIA chief historian has identified several mistakes: former DCI William Casey was never a corporate law professor (123); former DCI John McCone left CIA in 1965 not 1963 (231); the DCIs after Dulles were not “mostly military men,” only four so qualified (175); Radio Liberty was established in 1953 not 1951 (26); Johnson does not acknowledge that chief of station Larry Devlin slow-rolled and did not implement the CIA's order to assassinate Patrice Lumumba (94–5);^a the assertion that more CIA officers were killed in Laos than any other covert action program is incorrect (Afghanistan has that distinction) (106); the CIA abandonment of the Hmong occurred in 1975, not 1968, and resulted from the US withdrawal from South Vietnam (107); no mention is made of KGB support to Allende in Chile although the article by Kristian Gustafson and Christopher Andrew describing it is cited in the bibliography (110); and the clandestine service was never called the Psychological Strategy Board (181).

With the qualifications noted, *The Third Option* is an excellent source for the study of covert action as a factor in US foreign policy. It will add greatly to the reader's knowledge of the topic while providing a good test of their fact-checking skills. An important contribution.

a. See Paul Long's review of *White Malice*, by Susan Williams, elsewhere in this edition.

History

Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949, by Thomas Boghardt. (Center for Military History, United States Army, 2022) 546 pages, footnotes, bibliography, photos, maps, glossary, index.

With the help of British and Canadian troops, American soldiers conducted combat operations that defeated Germany in the West and then served as occupation forces until 1949. The role of intelligence in these events through Victory in Europe Day (May 8, 1945) has received extensive attention from historians, but the contribution of US Army intelligence during the occupation has been neglected. Thomas Boghardt, a senior historian at the US Army Center for Military History and contributor to *Studies in Intelligence*, corrects that omission in his new book *Covert Legions*.

The first part of this three-part work discusses the army's wartime intelligence organizations and the general nature of the operations undertaken. The second part "examines the administrative structure of Army Intelligence in occupied Germany and gives an overview of the various headquarters organizations, the principal field agencies, and key personnel" (10) in addition to the relationships established with Allied intelligence services that continue to this day. Boghardt also discusses the difficulties acquiring and keeping qualified officers due to the prevailing reputation that military intelligence (MI) assignments hindered career advancement. Part three describes typical army intelligence operations and to some extent those of Allied services, civilian and military, in the occupation.

Covert Legions refers to the numerous intelligence organizations working in the occupation zone, the two primary US Army ones being the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the Army Security Agency (ASA). From time to time, mention is made of tactical MI units concerned with mail, telegram, and telephone censorship, and the stateside elements with which they interacted.

Covert Legions emphasizes how the intelligence missions during the occupation varied from those conducted during the war. Examples include denazification, the arrest of war crimes suspects, identifying capturing and interviewing German intelligence personnel and scientists and collecting relevant records and hardware. In addition, within two months of the war's end there were more than 70,000 POWs in US-run detention camps, with many awaiting interrogation. The magnitude of the problem

would later increase significantly with the influx of Soviet defectors—both deserters and former German POWs.

Those who performed these tasks included a number of German-speaking draftees and volunteers, many of whom were Jewish, called "the Ritchie Boys" because they received their training at Ft. Ritchie, Maryland. (3) They included some well-known names, including future Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger; Klaus Mann, novelist and son of famed German author Thomas Mann; African American classical singer William C. Warfield; and Stefan Heym, pseudonym of the socialist German writer Helmut Flieg, who resided in East Germany after the war. Several others later joined the new Central Intelligence Agency, including Henry D. Hecksher, Howard C. Bowman, and Capt. Henry P. Schardt. (29)

Boghardt presents an impressive range of operations undertaken during the occupation by various intelligence elements. Examples include neutralizing the putative German Werwolf stay-behind army, and later the recruitment of Willy Brandt as a CIC informant in 1948. (10) Before the occupation ended, many other senior German officials followed his example. (380) That same year the army collected aerial and agent intelligence during the Berlin Airlift.

Covert Legions also tells how the army dealt with civilian intelligence agencies, principally the OSS, MI6, and later the CIA. The OSS relationship was complicated during the war when MI6 discovered that the codes Allen Dulles was using were compromised by the Germans and he refused to stop using them. The dissolution of OSS after the war and the creation of the Strategic Services Unit as a cover name for continued clandestine operations resulted in another problem for the army in Germany: the name was not "army" enough. So the commanding general approved a new name: the War Department Detachment. When a *New York Times* story blew this cover in late 1947, the outed spies assumed the name Department of the Army Detachment, or DAD. In December, it assumed the designation Berlin Operations Base. (131)

And then there was the strange controversy over Hitler's death. Allied headquarters had little reason to doubt Hitler's suicide in his Berlin bunker, but they wanted to be sure and ordered Army Intelligence to investigate. The Red Army on May 9, 1945, had identified the burial site and secured the charred remains of Hitler, Goebbels, and their wives. "Hitler's skull," one Soviet intelligence officer marveled, "was almost intact, as were the cranium and the upper and lower jaws." Nevertheless, on 6 June, Joseph Stalin told Harry L. Hopkins, the top US representative in Moscow, that Hitler was alive. (189)

Boghardt also deals in detail with the Allied agreement that divided Berlin into American, British, French, and

Soviet zones and the challenging relationships that resulted. Operation Rusty, the treatment of the remnants of the Vlasov Army of Soviet POWs who agreed to fight for Hitler during the war, is one example. Although the Allies agreed to return them to Soviet Union, some ended up at the interrogation center in Fort Hunt, Virginia.

Covert Legions is an impressively documented thorough account that fills an important gap in Army intelligence history that will be of great value to those studying the subject. Although not available from bookstores or popular online book sources, it can be acquired from the US Army Center of Military History.

The Island of Extraordinary Captives: A Painter, a Poet, an Heiress, and a Spy in a World War II British Internment Camp, by Simon Parkin (Scribner, 2022), 432 pages.

Tens of thousands of Germans fled to Great Britain in the late 1930s, a mix of Jews, anti-Nazi activists, and artists and intellectuals purged from the universities and other institutions. If they did not always receive a warm reception in the United Kingdom, at least they were tolerated and no longer had to fear being dragged off to a concentration camp, or worse.

Until the summer of 1940, that is. In the wake of the fall of France, Britain was swept by a spy mania and fear that enemy aliens—as Germans in the UK were defined, regardless of why they were there—would form a fifth column during what looked like an imminent invasion. Following Winston Churchill's instruction to "collar the lot," the refugees were rounded up and deposited in internment camps. The blanket decision sent some 25,000 people, including a smattering of actual Nazis and German POWs, to bleak, hastily prepared camps where they waited to be shipped to Canada or Australia, or to an unknown fate. The British government soon realized the mistakes it had made and, with the invasion threat waning in the fall of 1940, began to release the internees. Still, it took a couple of years before everything was sorted out; after they were released, many of the internees joined the British armed forces and intelligence services, where they made impressive contributions to the fight against Hitler.^a

British journalist Simon Parkin tells the internees' history by focusing on one refugee, an orphaned Jewish

teenager and budding artist named Peter Fleischmann, who had arrived alone in December 1938 on a *Kindertransport*. The story of his initial experiences in England was largely one of neglect, until he was locked up in Hutchinson, a camp for 1,200 men on the Isle of Man. There Fleischmann's luck turned, as he fell into what had become a community of writers, intellectuals, and artists who had organized to turn the camp into a combination artists' colony, literary circle, and university-in-exile. The artists soon recognized Peter's talent, took him under their wing, and ultimately were able to help him get released to go to an art school. He studied until 1943, when he was old enough to be drafted into the army, serving as an interpreter first for POW interrogations and then at the Nuremberg Trials. Under the name Peter Midgley, Fleischmann became a well-known artist in postwar Britain.

Parkin's account of camp life is detailed, including both the good and the bad, and his telling of how the internees coped with their situations is often moving. The ironies jump off the page—these were people who had fled from a totalitarian state to a free country only to be locked up, and most of them wanted nothing more than to contribute to Britain's war effort in whatever way they could. Parkin's prose makes the internees' sense of frustration palpable.

a. For the story of the refugees who joined the fight, see Helen Fry, *Churchill's German Army* (History Press, 2010).

As it turned out, there was one actual spy among the Hutchinson internees. It's a strange and pathetic tale, more of a sideshow than anything else, though Parkin skillfully weaves it into his main narrative. Intelligence readers may draw a few lessons from it, but the primary value of *The*

Island of Extraordinary Captives is that it reminds us of the human cost of spy manias and panic.

The reviewer: J.E. Leonardson is the pen name of a CIA analyst and regular *Studies* contributor.

Prisoners of the Castle: An Epic Story of Survival and Escape from Colditz, the Nazis' Fortress Prison, by Ben Macintyre. (Crown, 2022) 342 pages, bibliography, photos, appendix, index.

Colditz castle is a Renaissance-era edifice in the German state of Saxony. During World War II it was a high-security POW camp designated by the Germans as Oflag IV-C. After the war several books and at least one movie characterized the Colditz captives as “prisoners of war, with mustaches firmly set on stiff upper lips, defying the Nazis by tunneling out of a grim Gothic castle on a German hilltop, fighting the war by other means.” Journalist Ben Macintyre writes that “like all legends, that tale contains only a part of the truth.” (ix) *Prisoners of the Castle* tells quite a different story.

There were more escape attempts from Colditz than any other camp. One of the qualifications for internment there was previous failed escape attempts from other camps. High rank and family connections also played a role. For example, Giles Romilly, a journalist and communist, was confined to Colditz because his mother was the younger sister of Clementine Churchill, Winston Churchill's wife. (70) Similarly, Florimond Joseph Du Sossioit Duke, an OSS officer of high American social standing, was the first American prisoner in Colditz. Macintyre characterizes him as one of the least successful secret agents of the war after telling of a rather courageous though unsuccessful effort to conduct an operation in Hungary. (217–8)

Prisoners of the Castle also includes stories about both successes and failures in planning and execution, while providing biographical details on those involved, including the German guards who were members of the Wehrmacht not the Nazi party. Still, not all prisoners were keen to risk German retaliation by participating in or supporting escape attempts. Most, in fact, were content to wait out the war to gain freedom. A few cooperated with the Germans and met with British justice. Others had access to some “important (or at least interesting) intelligence” acquired from new arrivals and they developed a

method of coded communication with Britain. (100–101) Details of the code are given in the appendix. (315ff)

Airey Neave, a future aide to Margaret Thatcher, had failed to escape from a prison in Poland and would fail again after reaching Colditz. But he persisted and with a colleague, after a harrowing experience vividly related by Macintyre, became the first Englishman to escape from Colditz.

The most impressive escape attempts were made by “Michael Sinclair, a twenty-five-year-old British lieutenant who had already escaped twice from Colditz before being caught and brought back. Sinclair was fluent in German, a talented amateur actor.” (4) He came close to success when he impersonated German Sergeant Major Gustav Rothenberger. The story is mentioned in other books but not in such detail.^a

In addition to tunneling and impersonation attempts, a small group of men were hard at work on an ingenious escape plan to fly away in a glider they built in a room at the top of the castle. The operation was terminated on April 14, 1945, when control of Colditz passed from the guards to the prisoners. (272) Macintyre includes the only known photo of the glider taken by Lee Carson, who married a CIA officer after the war. (305)

While *Prisoners of the Castle* lists the many primary sources consulted, it does not include source notes, thus diminishing the book's scholarly value. But it is an enjoyable read and contains material not found in other accounts.

a. S. P. MacKenzie, *The Colditz Myth: British and Commonwealth Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany* (Oxford University Press, 2004).

Sidney Reilly: Master Spy, by Benny Morris (Yale University Press, 2022), 190 pages, bibliographical note, index, and ***The Greatest Spy: The True Story of the Secret Agent Who Inspired James Bond 007***, by John Harte (Cune Press, 2022), 271 pages, bibliography, photos, index.

Sidney Reilly is one of the most well-known names in espionage literature. British author Robin Lockhart called him the “Ace of Spies.”^a A very successful and fanciful television series starring Sam Neal appeared in 1983. Many books have included his spying exploits in China before World War I and his interwar experiences in New York, London, and Moscow, plus his flying lessons in Canada. Most accounts have dwelled on his role in the failed Lockhart Plot to overthrow the Bolshevik government, his post-war actions in Southern Russia, and his links to the Soviet Trust operation that led to his capture and demise. Andrew Cook’s contribution covered these topics and documented them with detailed endnotes and a bibliography.^b

The new contributions by Israeli historian Benny Morris and investigative journalist John Harte tell much the same story without providing specific citations. Both include bibliographical notes. Morris’s are excellent and include MI5 primary-source file designations, but the files are not linked to the narrative. For example, Morris writes that “In the first half of the twentieth century, and perhaps during the second half as well, Reilly was regarded in the English-speaking world as the gold standard of

espionage” without citing a source. (1) He doesn’t say by whom.

Harte resurrects the fairytale that Reilly was the basis for Ian Fleming’s James Bond novels as “shown by his secret Admiralty intelligence files” (262) but offers no documentation. He does mention some participants not included in Morris or Cook and he analyzes some of the accounts by other authors, but nothing is sourced and thus doesn’t indicate why his comments should be accepted. He also adds some new material from letters written by Reilly’s wife, but it has little impact the basic story. The dominant weakness of the book is that the frequent quoted dialog is unsourced.

There is little doubt that Sidney Reilly used his fluency in four languages and his ingenuity deal-ing with people to aide various intelligence services, and both Morris and Harte convey that message. But their methodology fails to confirm that Reilly was either “the greatest spy” or a “master spy.”

These books provide a useful introduction to the Sidney Reilly legend, but Cook provides a more solid foundation.

The Venlo Sting: MI6’s Deadly Fiasco, by Norman Ridley (Casement Publishers, 2022), 207 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In November 1939, British Major Richard Henry Stevens, the MI6 Passport Control Officer in the Netherlands, and his colleague Sigismund (Sigi) Payne Best, an agent of MI6 officer Claude Dansey, traveled, with approval of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to the Dutch city of Venlo on the border with Germany. They had been ordered to rendezvous with the dissident aristocratic Prussian General Gustav Anton von Wietersheim, to discuss possible terms of an armistice if the Nazi regime could be toppled from within. Upon arrival, their German contact—who unbeknown to them was SS officer Walter Schellenberg—escorted them from the Dutch to the German side of the border where they were captured. Interrogation was followed by five years of captivity. The

story came to be known as the Venlo Incident and was later the subject of several books.

In *The Venlo Sting*, author Norman Ridley repeats the story while adding historical background. He also suggests that the operation was undertaken at least in part in response to Hitler’s belief that the British Secret Intelligence Service had been responsible for a recent attempt on his life at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich. (177–8) Although Ridley does not cite a specific source, the story is supported by other accounts. But Ridley’s claim that either Payne or Best had “upon his person a list of active British agents working in the Netherlands” is not substantiated.

a. Robin Lockhart, *Reilly Ace of Spies* (Stein & Day, 1968).

b. Andrew Cook, *On His Majesty’s Secret Service: The True Story of Sidney Reilly Ace of Spies* (Tempus Publishing, 2002).

Ridley does document the assertion that under Gestapo questioning both Best and Stevens told all they knew about British intelligence operations in the Netherlands, although much of it was already known thanks to German infiltration of the Dutch operations before Venlo and contributions from British intelligence officer and German agent Charles Ellis. (47)

The final chapter on the aftermath of the incident discusses its impact on the Foreign Office, but is not sourced at all. An appendix, based on Imperial War Museum records, discusses how Payne and Best corresponded while in concentration camps and after the war and mentions some disagreements, but no specific sources are identified. (239) A decent review of a well-known operation with little new.

Intelligence Abroad

The Handbook of Asian Intelligence Cultures, by Ryan Shaffer (ed.) (Rowman & Littlefield, 2022), 458 pages, end-of-chapter notes, index.

The WorldCat is an online database linking thousands of libraries that users can use to determine what books and related media exist in selected collections on a subject of interest. For example, a search of libraries in India—the world's largest democracy—for items on intelligence “reveals about 250 English and non-English books, articles, videos, and other media.” For comparison, a search for the just “Central Intelligence Agency” returns more than 15,300 items. (xiv)

might be expected, Pyongyang's domestic service largely mirrors the governing elite's brutal efforts to subjugate the country's population and neutralize the regime's domestic enemies. Its foreign intelligence elements on the other hand have a long and well-chronicled history of recognizing—and quickly responding to—international challenges, with a degree of astuteness that many Western intelligence services envy. (241)

Similar differences in varying degrees exist for the 30 intelligence services discussed in *The Handbook of Asian Intelligence Cultures*.^a Intelligence culture is a phrase the authors use to indicate that intelligence services are influenced by the history, forms of government, politics, economics, militaries, and societal conditions in the countries under consideration.

The chapter on Turkmenistan focuses on its intelligence history that reflects a mixture of residual KGB influences and local culture. (383) The discussion of India's intelligence services deals with their long-established services, the Intelligence Bureau (the domestic intelligence agency) and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), the external intelligence service.

After introductory comments that discuss Sun Tzu's *Art of War* and Kautilya's treatise the *Arthashastra* to establish that intelligence has roots in Asia, each of the 30 chapters provide an overview of the often little known contemporary intelligence services and the cultures of which they are a part in Central, East, South, and Southeast Asia.

The chapter on Taiwan's intelligence agencies considers reputation for active operations in the Indo-Pacific region and related covert actions that led to the 2020 modification of its National Intelligence Service Law (NISL), governing the conduct and the responsibility of Taiwan's modern intelligence organizations

The Handbook of Asian Intelligence Cultures makes clear that there is no single “Asian intelligence culture,” but rather there are many intelligence cultures and little-known services. Some like North Korea have two. As

These examples are indicative of what *The Handbook of Asian Intelligence Cultures* has to offer. The entries are well written and documented, comprising a very worthwhile contribution to the intelligence literature.^b

a. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

b. Ryan Shaffer, who has contributed to *Studies* several times, also edited *African Intelligence Services: Early Post-colonial and Contemporary Challenges* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021). See Charles Long's review in *Studies* 66, No. 2 (June 2022).

Canadian Military Intelligence: Operations and Evolution from the October Crisis to the War in Afghanistan, by David A. Charters (Georgetown University Press, 2022), 334 pages, end of chapter notes, bibliography, index.

In October 5–December 28, 1970, terrorists from the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapped a British diplomat and killed a provincial cabinet minister in a period known as the October Crisis. The Canadian military, supported by military intelligence, made an important contribution to reestablishing order that until now has not been told. (177) Years later, on December 1, 2011, Ottawa withdrew its forces from Kandahar, Afghanistan, a decade after the first Canadian troops arrived there. Military intelligence played a little-known essential role in this operation, too.

Because with few exceptions, Canadian military intelligence has received little study, the non-government Canadian Military Intelligence Association (CMIA) commissioned military historian David Charters, senior fellow at the Brigadier Milton F. Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick to write a history of intelligence support to these and related Canadian Armed Forces matters that took place in 1970–2010. (19–20) An additional objective, writes Charters, was to provide a basis for comparison with their British, American and Russian counterparts that “receive a disproportionate attention to the operations of secret foreign intelligence services—particularly the US Central

Intelligence Agency, Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, and the Soviet KGB.” (21–22) Of course, there may be a good reason for that.

Canadian Military Intelligence is presented in two parts preceded by introductory summary of the literature to date. The first part provides historical background from 1939 to 1970. It discusses the evolution of administrative, organizational, technical, and training functions at both the strategic and tactical levels. Of particular interest is the creation of Canada’s post-war SIGINT service and its place in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance.

Part two examines intelligence support to a selection of domestic and foreign Canadian Armed Forces operations from 1970 to 2010. Included are the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War; United Nations peacekeeping in the Balkans, 1992–95; supporting NATO in Bosnia 1996–2004; peace enforcement operations in Kosovo, 1999–2000; and the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan.

What emerges from *Canadian Military Intelligence* is a well-documented story of its evolution from a marginal to a professional modern military and defense activity.^a

Memoir

Spy Daughter, Queer Girl: A Memoir In Search of Truth and Acceptance in a Family of Secrets, by Leslie Absher (Latah Books, 2022), 229 pages.

During the early years of the late Kenneth Michael (Mike) Absher’s CIA career, he kept his employer’s identity secret from his daughter Leslie. She grew up thinking her amateur magician dad he was with the US Army. As Leslie matured, she decided to keep her lesbianism secret from her dad, fearing his reaction. *Spy Daughter, Queer Girl* is a memoir that reveals how each learned the truth about the other and of their bumpy path to understanding and reconciliation.

It was Leslie’s mother who finally insisted that Mike tell his children where he worked and when he hesitated, she revealed the reality. Leslie was shocked. Her dad wasn’t anything like James Bond’s conception of a spy. Moreover, what little she knew about the CIA was negative. Thus she concluded: “Everything wrong in our lives was because of his job—our constant moving, Mom’s unhappiness, my hiding who I was” was the CIA’s fault. (43)

Leslie’s secondary reaction was to read all she could about the CIA, and at first this disturbed her even more.

a. See also reviews by Joseph Gartin of *Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community*, by Stephanie Carvin, Thomas Juneau, and Craig Forcese (eds.), in *Studies* 65, No. 3 (September 2021), and *Intelligence Analysis and Policy Making: The Canadian Experience*, by Thomas Juneau and Stephanie Carvin, in *Studies* 66, No. 1 (March 2022).

At one point she asked her father, "Have you ever killed anyone?" At another she wondered if he was involved with harsh interrogations in Vietnam. Later she linked his service in Greece to the political turmoil there. Then she began collecting data for a book on the subject. (134) She would learn that the Greek security police and military police were the ones doing the torturing there, not the CIA. (148) Eventually she was convinced that the CIA officers serving there were not directly involved in any form of torture. (237)

Mike Absher learned his daughter's secret in a letter from her. "Dad called the day he received it. 'I can't accept this. It's not natural,' he said. 'But there's no reason for us to lose contact,' he added. Nevertheless, Dad and I

grew more and more apart. I convinced myself this was how it had to be." (108)

But the break wasn't total. Mike would later visit Leslie and her "whole lesbian tribe... how else would he know me if he didn't meet people who were important to me.... It wasn't a perfect gathering but at least it had happened. I could tell how uncomfortable it made Dad." (116)

Leslie and her father kept in touch. He told her about the book he was writing and they talked while he was in the hospital shortly before his death in 2012. *Spy Daughter, Queer Girl* is a candid expression of the difficulties some children of CIA officers experience with implicit suggestions for how they can be overcome.^a

The Yank: A True Story of a Former US Marine in the Irish Republican Army, by John Crawley (Melville House, 2022), 270 pages, prologue, photographs.

The title of John Crawley's intriguing if ultimately unsatisfying memoir might be all the summary that is needed. Crawley, whose parents were Irish, recounts his journey growing up in America, moving to the Republic of Ireland in 1972 to attend high school, and, upon his return to the United States in 1975, enlisting in the US Marine Corps. His goal: serve his tour, hone his military skills, and join the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, commonly IRA). In May 1979, after what seems to be an accomplished stint with an elite Marine recon unit, Crawley headed back to Dublin to find the IRA.

Surprisingly enough, this turned out to be less difficult than one might expect for an outlawed organization that in Ireland faced hostility from the government and police and in Northern Ireland (or the North of Ireland, as Crawley insists) encountered the full weight of British intelligence, military, and police might, not to mention Loyalist paramilitaries and IRA counterintelligence. Before long, though, Crawley is a sworn IRA member, assigned to a unit just over the border in the North.

Fresh from his military service and primed to offer his expertise to the cause, Crawley finds an organization by turns lethal and amateurish, hamstrung by haphazard training, poor planning, and a motley assortment of

small arms from farmhouse closets and long-ago wars. Notwithstanding the carnage it inflicted, from bomb-making to ambushes the IRA was uneven in its abilities. Crawley observes there was not "one IRA but a dozen different IRAs depending on the area and the calibre of the local commander," and ruefully recalls that his "first operation was what the Marine Corps would call a complete clusterf*** from beginning to end." (55) Crawley recounts in painfully stilted dialogue his efforts to school his fellow volunteers and leaders, evidently including senior IRA commander and future politician Martin McGuinness, on the finer points of tactics, ballistics, and weapons.

One imagines McGuinness (who died in 2017) was glad to see the back of him when in 1983 Crawley is dispatched on a mission: go to Boston and buy guns. Not surprisingly, buying guns in America was easy, but buying military-grade weapons in volume required a network, cash, and muscle. Enter notorious Irish-American gangster James "Whitey" Bulger. Crawley's telling of his time in South Boston with the dangerous and mercurial Bulger and his crew, including gangster Pat Nee, makes up the book's most suspenseful chapters. It all went sideways eventually, because not long after they had transferred their load of guns and gear from their trawler *Valhalla* onto the smaller

a. Kenneth Michael Absher's work appeared several times in *Studies*. He was also the author of *Privileged and Confidential: A Secret History of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board* and *Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First-Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis*.

Marita Ann off the coast of Ireland, the gig was up. Seized by the Irish Navy as the *Marita Ann* approached the coast on September 29, 1984, Crawley would spend a decade as a guest of the Crown in Portlaoise Prison.

It seems likely that the endeavor was compromised by several sources. At a minimum, Sean O'Callaghan—an IRA member, police informant, and probably MI5 source—alerted authorities. (164–65) *Valhalla* crewman John McIntyre was suspected by Bulger of spilling the beans to Boston police after arriving back in the United States; Bulger and his crew later tortured and murdered him. Crawley offers, “I later learned that the British played a major role in directing the operation against us, including the provision of air and submarine surveillance assets. British intelligence was able to inform their government before the Irish government knew of it.” (155)

Released on September 10, 1994, Crawley promptly reports back to the IRA, eager for a new mission. His passion evidently outweighing sound counterintelligence practices, by mid-1996 he and a handful of compatriots were in England planning a bomb attack on London's power grid. MI5, Scotland Yard's Special Branch, and the Metropolitan Police were all over them. (236) Captured and convicted, Crawley and five others in July 1997 are sentenced to 35 years in prison. (247) Not long after, Crawley is approached by two US Embassy officials (one

of whom he surmises was a CIA officer), with an offer of repatriation to the United States in exchange for information. (250) Crawley declined. Sent to an Irish prison months later and released on May 22, 2000, under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, Crawley remains a steadfast defender of the IRA's goals and a critic of its leadership.

Crawley pads his account with discursive lessons on Irish republicanism and British perfidy over the past few centuries. The effect calls to mind lines from the song “The Body of an American” by The Pogues: “But fifteen minutes later we had our first taste of whiskey/there was uncles giving lectures on ancient Irish history.” Crawley obfuscates selectively, leaving out names and other details when convenient, to this reader's frustration, and there is no index to help with fact-checking. He offers little reflection on his role in the fearsome toll the Troubles took on all sides. The most you can say is Crawley was no barstool soldier stuffing a few dollars into the Northern Irish Aid jar in a South Boston pub. At the same time, *The Yank* is a reminder for intelligence and law enforcement that taking up arms need not always be the culmination of a complex pathway of radicalization. Instead, Crawley seems to have simply decided it was a good idea at the time, and he has not changed his mind 40 years on.^a — *The reviewer*: Joseph Gartin is managing editor of *Studies*.

Fiction

The Able Archers: Based On Real Events, by Brian J. Morra (Koehlerbooks, 2021), 270 pages, appendices.

Former intelligence officer and retired senior aerospace executive Brian J. Morra has supplied a novel piece of historical fiction with *Able Archers*, a crisp read of approximately 250 pages chock-full of Cold War paranoia and nuclear brinkmanship. In particular, Morra focuses his sights on two fictional protagonists, one from both the American and Soviet sides. Both men describe in the first person their backdoor diplomacy to avert Armageddon against the backdrop of NATO's Able Archer 83 exercises in November 1983. Much of the novel feels eerily biographical and with good reason: Morra worked directly

on the Japanese-US intelligence investigation of Russia's downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 (KAL 007) on September 1, 1983, and his obvious expertise on geopolitics shines throughout the novel. Ultimately, *Able Archers* trades persuasively on its author's subject-matter knowledge to overcome sometimes clunky dialogue and dubious plot twists.

Morra builds his narrative around three key events constituting perhaps the most risk-laden period of the entire Cold War, none of whose wider significance was

a. See also my review of Aaron Edwards' well-researched *Agents of Influence: Britain's Secret Intelligence War against the IRA* (Merrion Press, 2021) in *Studies in Intelligence* 65, no. 4 (December 2021). Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman provide a wealth of original materials on London's struggle to make sense of the Troubles in *Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History* (Georgetown University Press, 2011). See also Anne Cadwallader's damning *Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland* (Mercier Press, 2013). Among the best general histories is *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* by Richard English (Macmillan, 2003).

understood at the time outside a small group of military leaders on both sides of the divide. With a professional's grasp of the subtleties, he lays out the finer details of the KAL 007 shootdown that include, for example, the key personalities and details on radar, aircraft, and Soviet air command. The book then moves logically to an episode later that month when Soviet Lt. Stanislav Petrov refused orders to fire Russian ballistic missiles at the United States, despite warnings from Soviet radar that a US strike was incoming. Finally, the book's apex arrives as the two protagonists struggle to broker a standdown of their respective sides during Able Archer 83 inside a cramped East Berlin meeting room. Armchair Cold War historians already know the outcomes, but Morra's prose does credible work bringing the human element alive, particularly where it highlights the finer points of the intelligence and military elements in the equation.

Morra's chosen profession was intelligence and geopolitics, not novel writing, and this lack of experience occasionally makes for bumpy reading. Not once but twice, Morra inserts profanity-laden insults into the mouth of a key protagonist that seem out of character and not essential to the overall plot. Morra makes infrequent use

of facial expressions, thoughts, or atmosphere to relate plot progression, instead choosing stencil-kit dialogue that reads like a scripted situation report designed to convey information to the reader. Rarely are the actions and behavior of characters three-dimensional. Even the main protagonists serve Morra's preferred approach of communicating information and tension like rote actors. As for the plot, it flows but sometimes feels too fortuitous. Lost loves are reunited randomly across years and continents. The Russian protagonist succeeds in extracting an American from Soviet captivity in mere minutes using threats and bluff. His American counterpart then persuades both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher to change their wardrobes as a sign of their peaceful intentions.

Taken together, these less artful elements might doom another, more sprawling tome. *Able Archers*, however, succeeds despite them because of its brevity and authenticity. Its author asks us to revisit well-worn events and does so persuasively. His approach allows us to feel the real, razor-sharp tension surrounding them again, and paradoxically, for the first time.^a—*The reviewer*: Graham Alexander is the pen name of a CIA operations officer.

The Bucharest Dossier: A Novel, by William Maz (Oceanview Publishing, 2022), 376 pages.

Rare, indeed, is the spy thriller that saves its biggest surprises for the author's note. William Maz manages this feat in his debut novel, *The Bucharest Dossier*. In his note he writes that his work "provides a plausible scenario" to explain the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Maz's startling claim comes at the conclusion of a story so full of conspiracy theories that it distorts the historical record beyond any fair measure of credulity. In it, CIA secretly hires Arab snipers, smuggles them into Romania, and has them shoot demonstrators from the rooftops of Timisoara, a city in western Romania.

The logic behind this move, it transpires, is to forestall a peaceful transition of power by stoking popular fury against Romania's odious, long-tenured dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. This sensational and completely implausible scenario is indicative of the novel's fatal flaw. Namely,

digressions from the historical record or even realistic depictions of intelligence work are often forgivable provided the plot remains plausible and suspenseful. Regrettably, Maz bends and finally breaks this commandment after piling one too many canards onto a once promising premise.

Maz's work actually starts with punch and intrigue. There is a mysterious murder and a secret mission that requires CIA officer Bill Hefflin, to deploy to Bucharest in December 1989. Maz seems to lack even the most rudimentary understanding of how CIA recruits personnel, handles assets, or manages foreign operations though this at first seems forgivable because of his obvious familiarity with Romanian culture. Hefflin, we learn, is a Romanian-American who left his home at a young age and later entered Harvard University. This mirrors Maz's own background and his portrayal of Hefflin's feelings toward

a. Those driven to read non-fictional treatments of the Able Archer episode should visit the following *Studies* reviews of two books on the subject and read a monograph published by the Center for the Study of Intelligence: Douglas Garthoff review of Taylor Downing, *Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink* (Da Capo Press, 2018) in *Studies* 62, No. 3 (*Extracts*, September 2018); David A. Foy review of Marc Ambinder, *The Brink: President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983* (Simon & Schuster, in *Studies* 62, No. 4 (*Extracts*, December 2018); Benjamin B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997). All are available at <https://www.cia.gov>.

his homeland has a ring of authenticity lacking in other plot points or characters.

Bucharest under Ceausescu was notorious for its concrete monstrosity and police-state-induced torpor. Maz paints an accurate portrait of this grim reality but nonetheless manages to tease out the bittersweet feelings of affection that many Romanian emigrés harbored for their country. Hefflin arrives in Bucharest for his mission and the hopeful reader accompanies him believing that, at the least, Maz's story will weave compellingly into the well-known drama of Ceausescu's ouster and execution.

A strong opening, however, is no guarantee for a compelling plot. The novel's third act contains a series of events and coincidences so incredible that *The Bucharest Dossier* becomes less an espionage tale than a piece of absurdist art. A few plot points may help to illustrate: working as an analyst on official travel to Bucharest, Hefflin is nonetheless the officer allowed to meet CIA's top Soviet asset, which he does in a restaurant the asset selects in central Bucharest. Romanian surveillance trails Hefflin to the meeting, but both he and the asset escape unscathed. They continue to meet using phones to signal meetings, one of which takes place at the asset's residence in Bucharest.

The Wayward Spy—*A Novel* by Susan Ouellette (CamCat Publishing, 2021), 307 pages, author's note.

In Susan Ouellette's debut novel *The Wayward Spy*, a young woman, reeling from the news of the sudden death of her fiancé overseas under murky circumstances, embarks on an odyssey to learn the truth. Both of the engaged individuals have an intelligence nexus. Maggie works in Washington, DC, for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and is a former CIA analyst. The recently deceased Steve was a CIA operative posted abroad in Georgia. Action alternates between Washington and this former Soviet state, where an apparent terrorist bombing has just taken the husband-to-be's life. Maggie must sort out whom to trust among a mix of US intelligence and legislative officials, Georgian government personnel, and Chechen militants. Not only does she learn that Steve was the likely target of the attack, but allegations quickly surface that he was a traitor, supplying intelligence to the Russians. The first event alone could easily have set the plot in motion; the second throws Maggie into overdrive.

Once the Arab snipers have fired in Timosoara, Hefflin stumbles across his lost love from a decade before and frees her from Romanian captivity after impersonating a Securitate officer. Hefflin then finds himself in a fistfight with his station chief in Bucharest who, in turn, is assassinated by a CIA-funded hitman after threatening to reveal the CIA's role in the Timosoara shootings. Hefflin emerges unscathed from the chaos, but only after he murders a senior agency official with poisoned whiskey after the officer attempts to blackmail him into silence.

None of these plot points even touches upon the preposterous denouement, as Maz ties up the narrative using a main character with seemingly omnipotent powers designed to manufacture the happiest possible ending for Maz's alter ego. It is an ironic point that actually makes *The Bucharest Dossier* a worthwhile read for an unintended audience. Whatever its flaws, Maz's work does offer the chance for readers to observe firsthand an Eastern Bloc mentality, which assumes intelligence agencies are both nefarious and all powerful and where "the official line" of any history is never the accepted truth. This allowed, readers seeking a plausible, realistic espionage thriller should look elsewhere.—*The reviewer*: Graham Alexander is the pen name of a CIA operations officer.

In some respects, Maggie is a variant of Tom Clancy's Jack Ryan. In *The Hunt for Red October*, the Russia expert Ryan tells the national security advisor he's "only an analyst" before being thrust in over his head. One sees echoes of Ryan when Maggie introduces herself as "just a lowly intelligence analyst" (48); she likewise has a Russian background and quickly becomes embroiled in a crisis not of her making. And as Ryan's military background fleshes him out to be something more than he seemed at first blush, one learns that Maggie has received a bit of operational training at CIA's legendary facility for recruits, which she puts to use to free herself when taken captive. Yet the parallel only goes so far. Ryan's mission was directed from the White House; Maggie's is self-assigned and far more personal.

Ouellette, a former HPSCI staffer and CIA analyst, notes in a postscript that "*The Wayward Spy* addresses a lesser-known dynamic in the Intelligence Community—the place where politics and intelligence collide. That's where Maggie comes in." Yet she fails to make the most of this;

one can't help feeling that there is untapped potential here. Maggie's intelligence background is ancillary, a supporting role at best; the book revolves far more around the intelligence ties of the fiancé and others. And while it demonstrates a political nexus in the end, this aspect, too, receives lesser billing throughout most of the story.

The plot could have benefited from some decluttering; simpler is often better. For one thing, a few too many back-and-forths between a character appearing either good or bad leaves one's head spinning, and ultimate explanations can fall short. Coincidences abound: two key individuals just happen to have been college classmates with a grudge and the same villain just happens to keep showing up in different guises. Some scenes come across as over the top. We are to believe that a mysterious caller with a "thick" accent is the head of Russian intelligence, phoning Maggie out of the blue to say that her fiancé was a Russian collaborator. (12–13) Would the CIA's chief of counterintelligence really steal a document from a top US government official? "I'm like the invisible woman during these meetings. While they were trading golf stories, I slipped a copy of the cable out of the FBI Director's folder." (83) And in a flashback to Maggie and Steve's first encounter at a party of mostly CIA employees, in the space of a few sentences the author employs some of the oldest clichés in the business and invites comparisons to a Harlequin Romance:

"Are you one of them?" she nodded toward the crowd in the living room.

"If I told you, I'd have to kill you."

"The way the party's going, you'd be doing me a favor."

He laughed and extended his right hand. "Steve Ryder."

The warmth from his touch spread up her arm and across her chest and face. In the presence of this real-life American James Bond, she suddenly forgot how to speak. Good Lord, he was gorgeous. (48)

The novel is set in November 2003 but little is made of Georgia's "Rose Revolution" occurring then; the author seems to have chosen the date purposely but then forgot about it. Other real-life backdrops might have been better leveraged. The death a decade earlier of CIA officer Freddie Woodruff, killed by a hail of bullets while a passenger in a vehicle in the Georgian countryside—the motivation a subject of debate to this day—is one possibility. Another is the Boston Marathon bombing, combining the novel's strands of terrorism and Chechnya. A sharper blue pencil also would have caught some distractions. Repeated references to the "Axis of Evil" do not seem to be channeling President George W. Bush's invocation of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; their meaning never becomes clear. Versions of Maggie's backstory conflict, and HPSCI offices are variously located in the Capitol's attic and crypt.

Despite these shortcomings, Ouellette deserves credit for portraying Maggie as far from one-dimensional. Most notably, she is courageous; when her life is in danger at the hands of an assassin, Maggie is no damsel in distress, but attempts to break free multiple times, exhibiting strength and quickness of thought. The most prominent intelligence figure in the story, a senior official at CIA Headquarters, is similarly not just a caricature. In addition, she evokes the challenges of life in the intelligence arena. When Maggie is conflicted about how to judge an action of this same CIA official, "It was impossible to measure sincerity in a person whose profession is based on deception." (41)

In an author's note, Ouellette writes, "I show that CIA is comprised of every kind of human, including the heroic, the cowardly, the conniving, and the honest. It is a complicated organization filled with complicated people." So, too, is *The Wayward Spy* a complicated endeavor. But if Ouellette takes her writing to the next level, it would not be hard to see Maggie return as a recurring character uncovering intelligence intrigue through a series of congressional oversight investigations—a niche field in espionage literature that is open for exploitation.—*The reviewer:* Mike R. is a member of CIA's History Staff.



